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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE 
TWOMBLY IN CONTEXT: WHY FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 4(B) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
E. Donald Elliott

 
Abstract 
Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure delegates to 
private parties state authority to compel a person to appear and answer 
civil charges in court without any preliminary state review or screening 
for reasonableness. This is argued to be unconstitutional as a 
unreasonable seizure of the person, a deprivation of private property 
without due process, and a standardless delegation of state power to a 
private party with a financial interest. 
The history of the writ of summons is reviewed. From the Founding 
until 1938, federal courts reviewed the grounds proposed for suit prior 
to service of a summons ordering someone to come to court to answer 
charges. It is argued that unless courts routinely award full economic 
costs after the fact to make someone whole who has been sued 
wrongfully, they must satisfy themselves in advance that there is a 
reasonable basis for suit before ordering the persons sued to appear and 
answer. 
Rule 4(b) is argued to be unconstitutional as (1) a seizure of the 
person and property of the defendant without any attempt by the state to 
verify that it is reasonable to do so; (2) an unconstitutional deprivation 
of property without due process of law; (3) an unconstitutional 
delegation of state power to issue a court order to a private party with a 
financial interest, and (4) an unconstitutional repeal of a statute 
providing for judicial control over process without following 
constitutionally required procedures.  
 The policy issues are even clearer than the constitutional ones. The 
current practice of delegating government power to private parties with 
an interest in the outcome who do not pay the full social costs of their 
speculation creates incentives to over-supply litigation and to file strike 
suits. The Supreme Court decisions in Iqbal and Twombly correctly 
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identified this problem, but they misdiagnosed it as lying in Rule 8 
relating to general rules of pleading, rather than Rule 4 relating to the 
“right” of anyone to compel anyone to come to court about anything 
without any prior review by the court. A possible solution, the “Pre-
Service Plausibility Determination,” is suggested based on the system of 
preliminary review before service that is followed in many other areas 
of domestic law as well as some other countries. 
The issue of “reasonable but speculative” claims is also considered, 
and it is argued that the decision to allow such claims should not be 
delegated to plaintiff’s lawyers, but discovery to find missing link 
evidence should be allowed on a discretionary basis under Rule 27 at 
the expense of the plaintiff’s lawyer, who will benefit economically if 
the case is successful. 
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Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the idea 
was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in. 
– Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissenting in Bell Atlantic Corp v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 575 (2007). 
Every reform, however necessary, will . . . be carried to an excess, that 
itself will need reforming. 
– Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1817)1 
In this country, the system of laws is such that a trial lawyer can say 
any damned thing in a claim letter—any fantasy, however fictitious—
send it off, and next thing you know, you are shelling out time and 
money defending yourself against a fantasy.  It is a nightmare, only it’s 
real. 
– Ben Stein2    
INTRODUCTION 
Viewed from the standpoint of strategic incentives, Rule 4(b) is the 
foundation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
3
: the state compels 
someone to appear in court and expend resources to move or answer 
without regard to the plausibility of the claims. Rule 4(b) is probably 
unconstitutional, but it is certainly bad policy and creates a distorted 
incentive structure. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
4
 represents a well-
                                                                                                                     
 1. SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA 13 (George Sampson ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1920) (1817); see also Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL 
L. REV. 603, 624 (1985) (“The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems 
created by the preceding generation’s procedural reforms.”). 
 2. Benjamin J. Stein, Down in the Desert, THE AM. SPECTATOR 59 (Feb. 2012), available 
at http://spectator.org/archives/2012/02/22/down-in-the-desert. 
 3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in 1938, and provided the first 
uniform system of civil procedure in the federal courts of law. See Michael C. Dorf, Meet the 
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Same as the Old Rules?, FINDLAW (July 18, 2007), 
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/20070718.html (“For most of American history, federal trial 
courts followed the same rules of procedure as the state courts in the states in which they sat. 
When most litigation was local, this made good sense. A lawyer practicing almost exclusively in 
North Carolina didn’t need to learn one set of rules for state court and a second for the rare 
occasions on which his clients ended up in federal court. He only needed to master the North 
Carolina rules. . . . By the Twentieth Century, however, the business and bar of the federal 
courts had become increasingly specialized and national. Lawyers who specialized in federal 
litigation wanted the ability to go into a federal courthouse anywhere in the country and use the 
same set of rules, rather than having to master the procedures of fifty different states. Thus, in 
the 1930s, Congress opted for inter-state uniformity over intra-state uniformity by enacting the 
Rules Enabling Act. In addition to favoring national practitioners, . . . the reforms of the Federal 
Rules . . . did away with many of the technicalities that existed under state rules . . . .”). 
 4. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (requiring plaintiffs to plead sufficiently to show their 
claims are “plausible”). 
3
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intentioned but misdirected attempt by the U.S. Supreme Court to fix 
this fundamental problem in the incentives created by the Federal Rules, 
but it focuses in the wrong place. The problem is created pre-service 
and that is where it should be fixed.  
This Article argues that Rule 4(b) is broken and proposes how to fix 
it. Part I explains the problem with Rule 4(b) and the distorted 
incentives that it creates. Part II develops the constitutional case against 
Rule 4(b). Finally, Part III suggests an alternative procedure to require 
magistrate judges to test the plausibility of claims pre-service. 
I.  THE FATAL FLAW IN RULE 4(B) 
The fundamental flaw in Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure
5
 is that it delegates governmental power to a private 
individual to compel another to appear and defend, at significant cost 
and inconvenience, without either a preliminary inquiry by a judge or 
magistrate judge that the imposition on the defendant is reasonable, or a 
reliable practice of assessing the full costs imposed without proper 
justification retroactively if it turns out that the interference with the 
time and money of the person sued was not reasonable. This delegation 
of state power to hale
6
 people into court without safeguards is 
particularly anomalous because, as Judge Learned Hand famously 
reminded us, the greatest calamity that can befall a person, other than 
sickness or death, is to become involved in a lawsuit.
7
  
The unsupervised power that Rule 4(b) delegates to private parties 
with a financial interest is incongruous. Many similar provisions under 
which the government summons someone to account for her actions are 
preceded by a preliminary judicial inquiry appropriate to the 
circumstances before the state intrudes on a person’s most fundamental 
right: the right to be let alone.
8
 For example, we require a preliminary 
judicial inquiry into the bona fides of claims before: 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(b) (“If the summons is properly completed, the clerk must sign, seal, 
and issue it to the plaintiff for service on the defendant.”). 
 6. The proper word is “hale,” not “haul,” see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (9th ed. 
2009), although they have a common root in Middle English. See 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 9 (2d ed. 1989). 
 7. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 105 (1926) (“[A]s a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost 
anything else short of sickness and death.”). 
 8. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“[The Framers] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”); see also Samuel D. 
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
4
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 Issuing a warrant to search or seize;9 
 Summoning someone to answer criminal charges;10 
 Requiring someone to answer civil claims if brought in forma  
pauperis;
11
 
 Requiring someone to answer civil claims that may be brought  
in retaliation for exercise of their First Amendment rights (a so- 
called “strategic lawsuit against public participation” 
(SLAPP));
12
 
 Requiring someone to produce documents or testimony in  
response to a government inquiry;
13
 and 
 Requiring a government official to answer a petition for habeas  
corpus.
14
 
                                                                                                                     
 9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (“Obtaining a Warrant. (1) In General. After receiving an 
affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge . . . must issue the warrant if there is probable 
cause to search for and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device. (2) 
Requesting a Warrant in the Presence of a Judge. (A) Warrant on an Affidavit. When a federal 
law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government presents an affidavit in support of a 
warrant, the judge may require the affiant to appear personally and may examine under oath 
the affiant and any witness the affiant produces.” (emphasis supplied)). 
 10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a) (“The court must issue . . . at the government’s request, a 
summons . . . if one or more affidavits accompanying the information establish probable cause 
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.”). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006). 
 12. For a summary of a typical anti-SLAPP statute, see Oasis W. Realty v. Goldman, 250 
P.3d 1115, 1120 (Cal. 2011): 
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), provides: “A cause of action against a 
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States or the California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, 
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a 
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. . . . Only a cause of 
action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises 
from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a 
SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” 
Id. (quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002)). 
 13. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 653–54 (1950) (explaining that a 
court will enforce an administrative subpoena but only if reasonable). 
 14. For a typical rule, see, for example, C.D. CAL. R. CIV. P. 72-3.2: 
The Magistrate Judge promptly shall examine a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, and if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits 
annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Magistrate Judge 
may prepare a proposed order for summary dismissal and submit it and a 
proposed judgment to the District Judge. 
Id. The district court may enter an order for the summary dismissal of a habeas petition “[i]f it 
plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 
not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
5
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A preliminary determination by a judicial official reviewing the 
grounds for summoning someone to civil court is required by our long-
standing American legal tradition dating back to the Founding,
15
 as well 
as by the more recent “due process revolution.”16 Rule 4 is an isolated 
relic of the New Deal penchant for delegating governmental power to 
private actors
17
 that resulted from an unholy compromise between the 
drafters of the Rules and the practicing bar.
18
 It is time to fix Rule 4 by 
requiring a magistrate judge or other judicial official to review the 
grounds proposed for suit before issuing an order of summons to 
determine that they are plausible enough to justify haling the persons 
named in the complaint into court to answer the charges. That is the 
central insight which the Supreme Court was moving toward  in 
Twombly. Alternatively, if courts do not want to bother to assure 
themselves of the reasonableness of lawsuits before ordering people to 
spend time and resources answering them, we should routinely make 
whole those who are sued without sufficient justification by awarding 
the full costs imposed retroactively.
19
 
                                                                                                                     
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 5 (1976). Summary dismissal is appropriate if the 
allegations in the petition are “vague [or] conclusory” or “palpably incredible” or “patently 
frivolous or false.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75–76 (1977) (quoting Machibroda v. 
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted); Pennsylvania ex rel. 
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 119 (1956)). 
 15. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to 
Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 509–10 (2011) (“Although the propriety of the 
private exercise of public powers rarely has been litigated, the Supreme Court struggled with 
that question during the New Deal when Congress created a number of innovative governance 
structures combining public and private entities in an effort to end the Great Depression. Indeed, 
on several occasions, such as in Carter v. Carter Coal and in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, the Court invalidated delegations in part because of the role accorded private 
parties.” (footnotes omitted)). For more general discussions of the issues raised by delegations 
of government functions to private actors, see generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING 
SOVEREIGNTY (2007); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 
(2003). 
 18. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 19. I have argued elsewhere that regulating by incentives is more efficient than by judicial 
command and control. E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 326–34 (1986); E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: 
Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 488–89 (1989). 
While I adhere to my view from a quarter century ago that incentive-based procedure would be 
a theoretical first-best solution, there appears to be no willingness on the part of either the 
judiciary or Congress to abandon the so-called “American Rule” and move to a loser-pays 
system; instead, our current legal culture regulates litigation behavior, if at all, by judicial 
command-and-control (aka “managerial judging” or judicial discretion). For example, I have 
argued that the courts could better regulate scientific evidence through a system of economic 
6
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The key concept now missing from Rule 4(b) is a requirement for a 
routine preliminary determination by the judiciary that the grounds 
proposed for a civil suit are sufficiently plausible that it is reasonable 
for the government to compel someone to come to court to answer. I 
call this a “Pre-Service Plausibility Determination” (PSPD) and argue 
that it is required by our Constitution and tradition as well as by good 
policy and common sense. 
It has long been recognized that the most basic underpinning of due 
process is that “[t]he United States cannot . . . interfere with private 
rights, except for legitimate governmental purposes.”20 But under the 
current version of Rule 4(b) courts make no attempt whatsoever to 
determine that “a legitimate governmental purpose” is served by 
requiring someone to appear and answer in a civil case unless it is 
brought in forma pauperis. The criminal rules, in contrast, already 
routinely require a PSPD—a probable cause determination “by the 
court” before an order of summons is issued requiring someone to 
answer charges.
21
 In principle, there is little difference between the 
burdens that the government imposes on someone by issuing an order of 
summons requiring them to answer charges in a civil and a criminal 
case, although the ultimate consequences may be different.  
However, like the fish that does not see the water that surrounds it,
22
 
most courts and commentators
23
 have overlooked Rule 4 and the 
potential for abuse that it creates. Many casebooks and courses in civil 
procedure put great emphasis on the general rules of pleading under 
                                                                                                                     
incentives rather than preliminary screening by judges. Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based 
Procedure, supra, at 488–89. Nonetheless, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993), the Supreme Court imposed a system of preliminary screening by 
judges. The proposals in this Article should be regarded as a second-best approach, like 
Daubert, that moves in the right direction by improving the incentive structure of the litigation 
market in a way that is not only politically plausible because it is more consistent with our legal 
culture, but is also arguably constitutionally required. 
 20. Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718–19 (1879) (“The United States cannot any 
more than a State interfere with private rights, except for legitimate governmental purposes. 
They are . . . prohibited from depriving persons or corporations of property without due process 
of law.”). 
 21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a) (“The court must issue . . . at the government’s request, a 
summons . . . if one or more affidavits accompanying the information establish probable cause 
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.”). 
 22. This metaphor has been attributed to the anthropologist Margaret Mead: “If a fish 
were to become an anthropologist, the last thing it would discover would be water.” See George 
Spindler & Louise Spindler, Roger Harker and Schönhausen: From the Familiar to the Strange 
and Back Again, in DOING THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SCHOOLING: EDUCATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN 
ACTION 20, 24 (George Spindler ed., 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23. A notable exception is Professor Paul Carrington’s thoughtful article on Rule 4. Paul 
D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733 
(1988). However, Professor Carrington also focuses on the mechanics and consequences of 
service of process, and does not address the considerations raised in this Article. 
7
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Rule 8, and on motions to dismiss under Rule 12 but hardly mention 
Rule 4.
24
 Those that do discuss Rule 4 focus almost entirely on the 
mechanics and territorial limits of service.
25
 Scant attention is paid to 
the incentives that Rule 4 creates for nuisance settlements by requiring 
persons to expend resources to defend without a PSPD that it is 
reasonable to require them to do so. 
The recent initiatives by the Supreme Court in Twombly
26
 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
27
 to require that lawsuits be “plausible” have also 
wrongly focused on the general rules of pleading and motions to 
dismiss. Many of the problems in the American litigation system have 
their roots in Rule 4(b), and its state cognates, because that is where the 
principle is laid down that someone may use government power to 
impose costs on others regardless of the merit of their claims. This 
principle creates distorted incentives for rent-seeking
28
 and nuisance 
litigation that should be fixed either by requiring a PSPD before the 
courts command someone to appear and answer, or by a more reliable 
system for reimbursing persons wrongfully sued for their full costs, 
including attorneys fees and the loss of their time after the fact.
29
 
This Article argues that Twombly and its progeny are ultimately 
grounded in values of constitutional dimension, not merely optional 
constructions of the language of Rule 8(a)(2) requiring “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.” The Twombly Court put the problem succinctly: “[S]omething 
beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a 
plaintiff with ‘a largely groundless claim’ be allowed to ‘take up the 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1–39 (2d ed. 2009). Following an 
introductory chapter on general concepts of due process, even Professor Samuel Issacharoff, one 
of the most thoughtful of modern proceduralists, jumps right into the general rules of pleading 
and Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss without even mentioning Rule 4. This is the conventional 
approach, but it overlooks the important incentive structure that is already established by Rule 4. 
The person being sued—now arbitrarily reclassified by the state as a “defendant”—must expend 
resources to convince the court that the charges against him are baseless.  
 25. See, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 
35–55 (4th ed. 2009). 
 26. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 27. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 28. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 29. In theory, Rule 11 may provide such a remedy, but in practice it is rarely invoked, in 
large part because it is focused on “sanctions” (punishment) rather than “costs” 
(reimbursement). See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523 
(1984) (“Officials should create prices to compel decisionmakers to take into account the 
external costs of their acts, whereas officials should impose sanctions to deter people from doing 
what is wrong.”). 
8
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time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an 
in terrorem increment of the settlement value.’”30 
Motions to dismiss are decided too late to remedy the abuses at 
which Twombly and Iqbal were aimed. By the time that a motion to 
dismiss is granted, the persons sued have already been required to 
expend significant resources and thus the “in terrorem increment of the 
settlement value” has already occurred, although the extent varies 
depending on how much motions practice and discovery have been 
allowed. But filing a motion to dismiss does not stay discovery
31
 or the 
huge costs
32
 that it imposes. The Rules stipulate only that motions to 
dismiss “must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a 
deferral until trial.”33 My personal experience as a litigator is that 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and sometimes even millions, in 
defense costs can be incurred before judges rule on motions to dismiss. 
A good illustration that even successful motions to dismiss are 
granted too late to prevent significant harm is Ward v. Arm & 
Hammer.
34
 In that 2004 federal district court case, an inmate serving a 
long sentence in federal prison for selling crack cocaine sued a baking 
soda manufacturer for $425 million for failing to warn on its package 
that it was illegal to use the product to make crack cocaine.
35
 The 
federal district judge did eventually grant the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, pointing out among other things that the inmate had been 
sentenced in 1995 but had waited until 2003 to file the case. Thus, the 
claim on its face was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557–58 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 
347 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. SOLIDFX, LLC v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., No. 11-cv-01468-WJM-BNB, 2011 WL 
4018207, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 8, 2011) (“[Twombly] does not ‘erect an automatic, blanket 
prohibition on any and all discovery before an antitrust plaintiff’s complaint survives a motion 
to dismiss.’” (quoting In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., No. C 06-07417 WHA, 
2007 WL 2127577, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007)). 
 32. One study showed that for the years 2006–2008, companies paid an average per case 
discovery cost of $621,880 to $2,993,567. Lawyers for Civil Justice et al., Statement on 
Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies App. 1 at 15 fig. 11 (2010), available at 
http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/33A2682A2D4EF7
00852577190060E4B5/$File/Litigation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Companies.pd
f?OpenElement.  Costs of this magnitude are not, however, typical of all cases.  Bryant G. 
Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to The Markets in Legal 
Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV 597 (1998) (“The recent studies of civil 
discovery . . . establish beyond any reasonable doubt that we have two very distinct worlds of 
civil discovery. These worlds involve different kinds of cases, financial stakes, contentiousness, 
complexity . . . . The ordinary cases, which represent the overwhelming number, pass through 
the courts relatively cheaply with few discovery problems. The high-stakes, high-conflict cases, 
in contrast, raise many more problems and involve much higher stakes.”). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i). 
 34. 341 F. Supp. 2d 499 (D.N.J. 2004). 
 35. Id. at 500. 
9
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Despite the tardy and patently implausible nature of the complaint, 
under the mandatory command of Rule 4(b), the summons and 
complaint were duly served on the defendants. The defendants were 
thus ordered in the name of the court to answer the patently implausible 
charges, and were thereby compelled to incur the time and expense of 
retaining counsel to move or answer frivolous charges. The case was 
filed December 18, 2003, but not dismissed until October 21, 2004, over 
ten months later. In the meantime, the defendant spent tens of thousands 
of dollars
36
 to defend against a totally bogus claim.
37
 Adding insult to 
injury, on December 15, 2004, the Third Circuit granted Mr. Ward’s 
petition to appeal in forma pauperis,
38
 thereby obliging the defendant to 
incur even more expense. But as Chief Justice Randy Shepard of the 
Indiana Supreme Court has cogently explained: 
The parties who appear in our courts do so on an equal 
footing. For every citizen who files a frivolous pleading, 
there is a citizen who must spend money to respond. The 
threshold for frivolity should not be so low that it imposes a 
tax on responding parties, obligating them to spend money 
answering baseless claims as a way of encouraging others 
to be novel.
39
 
If a claim is implausible under Twombly, as this one was, the 
defendants should not be ordered by the federal government to come to 
court and spend valuable time and money to answer it in the first place. 
Indeed, under the procedures in effect from the Founding until 1938, the 
defendant in Ward v. Arm & Hammer would not have been ordered by 
the government to answer such patently frivolous claims.
40
 But today, 
because we lack a PSPD as a regular part of our civil procedure, a 
federal district court has no mechanism to decline to issue a court order 
to appear and defend at the request of anyone able to pay the filing fee, 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See Ted Frank, Because We All Love Wacky Pro Se Suits: Ward v. Arm & Hammer, 
OVERLAWYERED (Dec. 18, 2006), http://overlawyered.com/2006/12/because-we-all-love-wacky-
pro-se-suits-ward-v-arm-hammer (“Church & Dwight Co., the makers of Arm & Hammer, was 
forced to retain Morgan, Lewis & Bockius to file multiple briefs in the federal court at not 
inconsiderable expense to rid itself of this nuisance suit.”). 
 37. Personal communication, outside counsel for Arm & Hammer, Apr. 23, 2012 (on file 
with author). 
 38. Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Ward v. Arm & Hammer, 341 F. 
Supp. 2d 499 (D.N.J. 2004) (No. 3:03-cv-06113-SRC-TJB), available at http://www.over 
lawyered.com/cases/ward/wardifp.pdf. 
 39. Orr v. Turco Mfg. Co., Inc., 512 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ind. 1987) (Shepard, C.J., 
concurring). 
 40. See infra notes 104–05 and accompanying text on the discretion the clerk’s office 
exercised prior to the current version of Rule 4 not to issue a summons if a long time had passed 
since the events. 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/3
2012] TWOMBLY IN CONTEXT 905 
 
no matter how frivolous or stale the charges.
41
 Today no government 
official even reads the complaint or asks any questions before issuing an 
official court order requiring the persons sued to report to court and to 
answer civil as opposed to criminal charges. Issuing a governmental 
order without any attention to its underlying justification is a blueprint 
that guarantees that some of the government’s actions will be arbitrary. 
Moreover, it is an open invitation to rent-seeking—the private use of 
governmental power to extort economic value from others.
42
 
In addition to providing a remedy that comes too late in the process, 
Twombly and Iqbal are misdirected because the mechanism of detailed 
fact pleading is ill-suited to the task of screening claims, as opposed to 
testing theories for legal sufficiency.
43
 No one has yet shown that rules 
requiring more detailed fact pleading actually result in anything other 
than more detailed fact pleading.
44
 A mechanism more tailored to the 
task of screening out cases that should not be served must be 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text on the “ministerial” and non-
discretionary nature of current Rule 4(b). 
 42. See David R. Henderson, Rent Seeking, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS 445, 445 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008) (“‘Rent seeking’ is one of the most 
important insights in the last fifty years of economics . . . . The idea is simple but powerful. 
People are said to seek rents when they try to obtain benefits for themselves through the political 
arena.”). 
 43. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a 
court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 44. Professor Robert G. Bone’s otherwise excellent analysis of the economics of civil 
procedure suffers by assuming that detailed fact pleading will screen out baseless cases. See 
ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 125–57 (2003); id. 
at 126 (“One advantage of using detailed pleading requirements to screen frivolous suits is that 
pleading operates as a gatekeeper.”); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986) (analyzing more 
stringent pleading requirements). 
  It has never been demonstrated that detailed pleading requirements actually “screen” 
cases to any significant degree. It is equally plausible that clever lawyers will file most of the 
same cases anyway, merely pleading them in more detail. This is borne out by a study by the 
Federal Judicial Center of motions to dismiss after Twombly and Iqbal, which found more 
motions to dismiss were made but leave to amend was generally granted, resulting merely in 
more detailed pleadings. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 8–16 (2011); see also Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: 
Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (reporting that 
pleading-stage dismissals have increased after Twombly and Iqbal from forty-six to fifty-six 
percent). However, such short-term effects to rule changes tend to equilibrate as lawyers adapt 
their strategies to the new rules. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron 
Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 68, 77, 105 (1994); see also Ian Ayres, Playing Games 
with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1291–92, 1297–98 (1990) (arguing the dynamic game 
theory models are inherently superior to static microeconomic models for understanding law 
because players can adjust their strategies as rules change). 
11
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developed.
45
 In appropriate cases, this preliminary process of screening 
complaints before service could include a checklist regarding key 
evidentiary support, as well as a conversation by judges or magistrate 
judges with the plaintiff’s lawyer in which probing questions could be 
asked about what evidence is available to support certain key 
allegations or legal theories. I call these inquisitorial procedures by the 
judge or magistrate judge before the adversary process begins “Pre-
Service Plausibility Determinations.” They would be a return to our 
historical practice, as well as our current practice in many other areas of 
our law, in which the plaintiff’s lawyer appears in court to convince a 
judge or magistrate judge that the state should summon the persons that 
he wants to sue to answer his charges. It wasn’t until 1938, in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that federal law first granted an 
absolute “right” to a private citizen to commandeer the power of the 
state to order someone else into federal court. 
This strange departure from our usual approach of requiring 
safeguards against abuse of governmental power is sometimes justified 
by positing that the person suing is a “rights seeker,”46 but the person 
being sued is also a “rights seeker”: they just have different visions of 
their respective rights. A plaintiff’s alleged positive “right” almost 
always comes at the cost of curtailing the defendant’s reciprocal 
                                                                                                                     
 45. See infra Part III for a description of the preliminary processes that should be 
incorporated into Rule 4 to screen claims before they are served—the “Pre-Service Plausibility 
Determination.” They differ from fact pleading in that, in appropriate circumstances, the court 
should ask questions, rather than being bound by the assumption that the factual allegations of 
the complaint are true even if implausible and unsubstantiated. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(2)(A) 
(“When a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government presents an 
affidavit in support of a warrant, the judge may require the affiant to appear personally and may 
examine under oath the affiant and any witness the affiant produces.”). 
  In an early article after Twombly, Professor Richard Epstein recognized that the 
“plausibility” standard inherently involves factual inquiry and thereby elides the traditional 
distinctions between motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. See Richard A. 
Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary 
Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 72, 80 (2007). Epstein has subsequently proposed a 
system in which judges would reevaluate on an ongoing basis throughout the course of a case 
whether the case is strong enough to go to the next stage. See Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading 
and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 187, 205–07 (2011). I regard my suggestion for a Pre-Service Plausibility 
Determination as in the same spirit. 
 46. See, e.g., Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of 
Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2179 (1989) (citing Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 500 (1986); see also Robert L. 
Carter, Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights: The Relevance of Conley v. Gibson in 
the Era of Plausibility Pleading, 52 HOW. L.J. 17 (2008) (discussing the viability of civil 
procedure as an aid to civil rights claims in light of the trend toward plausibility pleading). 
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negative “right” to liberty and freedom of action.47 For example, in the 
recent case of Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes,
48
 the defendant was seeking 
the “right” of management to continue to give local store managers 
substantial discretion over the pay and promotions of the employees that 
they supervise, while the plaintiffs maintained that this policy 
discriminated against women.
49
 Both were “rights seekers” but of 
opposing reciprocal rights and the courts have to strike the right balance 
between them. The government has an obligation of constitutional 
dimension to treat both kinds of “rights seekers” neutrally unless and 
until it determines that there is a reasonable basis to favor the claims of 
one over the other. 
The bizarre, albeit now familiar, governmental practice of issuing 
official court orders based solely upon the unverified claims of persons 
who wish to sue is an open invitation to abuse. It is costly to answer 
charges, even if they are baseless and are ultimately dismissed, as 
illustrated by Ward v. Arm & Hammer. The problem is exacerbated 
because in America—unlike most of the rest of the world50—courts 
almost never impose the full economic costs including attorneys fees 
and compensation for lost time on losing parties in litigation.
51
 Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
 47. See generally PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS: LIBERATING AMERICANS 
FROM TOO MUCH LAW 11–12 (2009) (“The idea of freedom as personal power has been pushed 
aside in recent decades by a new idea of freedom—where the focus is on the rights of whoever 
might disagree with a decision.”). 
 48. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (U.S. June 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf. 
 49. Id. slip op. at 2, 4. 
 50. “In almost all other countries, except Japan and China, the winning party, whether 
plaintiff or defendant recovers at least a substantial portion of litigation costs.” AM. LAW INST. & 
INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 7 (2006).  
 51. Confusion may be created by Rule 54(d), which states that “Unless a federal statute, 
these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be 
allowed to the prevailing party.” However, the seemingly broad principle of Rule 54(d) is 
limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 which restricts “taxable costs” actually awarded in litigation to only 
a few minor items such as filing fees: 
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the 
following: 
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained 
for use in the case; 
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials 
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; 
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and 
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under 
section 1828 of this title. 
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someone can sue, whether or not they have a reasonable basis, and 
thereby impose substantial costs in terms of money and time on others 
with little or no risk that they will ever have to reimburse those injured 
by their actions. This is unfair, as well as an open invitation to strike 
suit arbitrage,
52
 and it never should have happened. But today the 
problem is much more intense than it was in 1938 because of the 
changing nature of federal litigation and the mushrooming costs of 
discovery, particularly in complex cases.
53
 
The pivotal wrong turn in our law to hand over to private parties 
with a financial interest in coercing settlements the state’s power to 
summon people to court was wrought in 1938 by what purported to be a 
merely technical change in an obscure rule governing service of 
process.
54
 In fact, however, the 1938 change in Rule 4 was a 
fundamental policy shift that quietly gutted statutes that had been 
passed by the First Congress in 1789 and made permanent by the 
Second Congress in 1792 to maintain judicial control over the power to 
issue writs, including the writ of summons to appear in a civil case.
55
  
                                                                                                                     
Id. Thus the “taxable costs” actually awarded under Rule 54(d) do not include the overwhelming 
majority of the actual economic costs incurred in litigation, including the time and money spent 
complying with discovery, and attorneys fees. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (adhering to the general “American rule” that attorneys 
fees are not awarded to the prevailing party absent a specific statute); Mary Jo Hudson, 
Comment, Expert Witness Fees as Taxable Costs in Federal Courts—The Exceptions and the 
Rule, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (1987) (“Throughout the history of the federal courts, the 
norm of taxing costs has been to limit the award of litigation expenses. This norm [is] 
commonly known as the American Rule.”). Thus, taxable costs actually awarded to prevailing 
parties absent a statutory exception typically fall far short of the full actual full economic costs 
contemplated by this Article as necessary to make someone whole for being sued wrongfully.  
 52. For a definition, see infra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 53. When the rules were adopted in 1938, most cases involved simple historical facts, 
such as an automobile accident, for which discovery was self-limited by the nature of the facts 
in controversy. Moreover, costly discovery of documents was only by leave of court until 1970. 
Today, however, many cases in federal court are structural reform litigations in which extensive 
and costly discovery is virtually automatic. See supra note 33. As a result of these changes in 
the background, the costs of requiring someone to appear and answer, which may have appeared 
de minimis in 1938, have grown to be substantial in many cases.  
 54. See infra Part II.A discussing the drafting history of Rule 4. 
 55. See infra notes 94–101 and accompanying text discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789 
and the Process Act of 1792. Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 275 (1789) (“[A]ll writs 
and processes issuing from the supreme or a circuit court, shall bear test of the chief justice of 
the supreme court (or if that office shall be vacant) of the associate justice next in precedence; 
and all writs and processes issuing from a district court, shall bear test of the judge of such court 
(or if that office shall be vacant) of the clerk thereof, which said writs and processes shall be 
under the seal of the court from whence they issue, and signed by the clerk thereof.”).  This 
followed verbatim in relevant part a statute enacted on a temporary basis by the First Congress. 
Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 1, 1 Stat. 93 (1789). See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River 
Paper Co., 19 F. 252, 253–54 (C.C.W.D. Wis. 1884) (“The summons, notice, writ, or whatever 
it may be called, by virtue of which a defendant is required to come into court and answer, 
14
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Some might object that returning to the pre-1938 practice of 
preliminary review before issuing process is too fundamental a change 
to consider. But preliminary judicial screening to weed out “junk 
lawsuits” is no more politically implausible today than judicial 
screening to weed out “junk science” seemed only a few years ago prior 
to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
56
 while imposing full 
costs retroactively is arguably inconsistent with the American legal 
culture.
57
 At base, the argument against screening cases by imposing 
full costs retroactively is that the in terrorem effect of self-executing 
threats of economic consequences will over-deter some cases that 
should be brought to the overall detriment of society.
58
 A PSPD by the 
judiciary, on the other hand, has the advantages that it is not 
economically punitive on either plaintiffs or defendants and that it is 
transparent. Judges must make and justify openly a determination that 
the claims are so implausible that the likely social benefit of allowing 
the case to go forward is not worth the cost, and this ruling is ultimately 
subject to the safeguard of review on appeal if trial judges deny the right 
to go forward. A PSPD is analogous to the existing requirement that a 
judge must restrict discovery if the likely benefits are outweighed by the 
costs,
59
 or a decision by the Supreme Court to deny a request to issue a 
                                                                                                                     
litigate his rights, and submit to the personal judgment of the court, must be ‘process within the 
meaning of the law of congress’ . . . is to be issued by the clerk of this court, under the seal of 
the court and tested in the name of the chief justice of the United States. . . . It is no doubt the 
policy of the law to keep process under the immediate supervision and control of the court.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 57. From 1983 to 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure experimented with 
mandatory imposition of sanctions under Rule 11. Most commentators agree that this 
experiment with mandatory financial sanctions for frivolous cases and motions was a disaster, 
see William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988), and therefore 
anything like it is unlikely to be tried again soon. There is, however, an important conceptual 
difference between costs for consuming resources and sanctions as punishment. See Cooter, 
supra note 29. The distinction is often overlooked by judges who tend to equate the two. See, 
e.g., infra note 153. 
 58. “Sometimes there are reasons to sue even when one cannot win . . . . The first attorney 
to challenge Plessy v. Ferguson was certainly bringing a frivolous action, but his efforts and the 
efforts of others eventually led to Brown v. Board of Education.” Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City 
of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). I agree with the first part, but not the 
second. Claims are not frivolous merely because they advance an “argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). But 
the rhetoric is symptomatic of a concern about over-deterring claims worth hearing that is 
prevalent in our legal culture. It does not follow, however, that the decision of what arguments 
for changes to existing law should take up the time of others should be delegated without 
judicial supervision to plaintiffs’ lawyers with a financial stake in the outcome. See infra Part II. 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“On motion or on its own, the court must limit the 
frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it 
determines that . . . the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
15
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writ of certiorari to decide an issue that someone would like the Court to 
decide. We all understand why the Supreme Court’s resources should 
not be wasted on cases that are not worth its time, but we have a blind 
spot when it comes to wasting the time and money of the persons sued 
in ordinary civil cases. 
American judges and magistrate judges routinely screen many other 
kinds of requests for judicial orders for reasonableness before imposing 
burdens on private citizens in the name of the judiciary.
60
 Reinstating 
judicial screening to prevent service of “junk complaints” by PSPDs in 
all civil cases, not just those brought in forma pauperis, would not be 
judicial activism, but rather a return to our long-standing Anglo-
American traditions and the original understanding and practices of the 
Founders from which we have unwisely deviated. Moreover, it is unfair 
and humiliating to subject poor people to pre-service review of their 
lawsuits but exempt those wealthy enough to pay a filing fee.
61
 
The root of the incentive structure about which the Twombly Court 
rightly complained is not in Rule 8 regarding pleadings, but in Rule 4 
regarding automatic and unthinking issuance of a court order to appear 
and defend. Rule 4 is what requires the person sued to expend resources 
regardless of the merits of the claim. Contrary to our long-standing 
traditions, Rule 4 now takes the judge completely out of the loop. The 
plaintiff’s lawyer now controls who is ordered by the court to appear to 
answer charges in a civil case. Thereby, Rule 4 strikes a fundamentally 
unfair and unconstitutional imbalance between the rights of persons 
who wish to sue and the rights of the persons whom someone wishes to 
sue. The state imposes substantial burdens on the latter based only on 
the unverified say-so of the former. But both are entitled to equal 
dignity before the law. The fundamental constitutional norm of state 
neutrality unless and until a reasonable basis is shown to distinguish 
among classes of citizens requires that the judiciary conduct a PSPD, a 
reasonable inquiry into the bona fides of a proposed lawsuit, before it 
disrupts someone’s right to be left alone. This is particularly true 
because the chances that anyone will actually be made whole afterwards 
if they are wrongfully sued are vanishingly small in our current system.  
                                                                                                                     
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving 
the issues.”). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652–53 (1950) (explaining 
that a court will enforce an administrative subpoena but only if reasonable). 
 61. See Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis 
Statute—Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413, 414 (1985), available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol54/iss3/3 (noting the anomoly that “can an in forma pauperis 
complaint be dismissed even though an identical paid complaint cannot be similarly dismissed?” 
but ultimately concluding that the difference in treatment is constitutional because wealth is not 
a suspect classification). 
16
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This Article makes the case that Civil Rule 4(b) is 
unconstitutional,
62
 but the policy issues are even clearer and more 
important than the constitutional ones. Even if Rule 4(b) isn’t 
technically unconstitutional, at least not in Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ sense of a bloodless prediction of “what the courts will do in 
fact,”63 it certainly should be unconstitutional. Fundamental norms in 
our law underlying several different constitutional provisions all dictate 
that the court should conduct an appropriate preliminary inquiry into the 
bona fides of claims that one citizen wishes to bring against another to 
determine that they are reasonably well-founded before the state 
imposes the burden of requiring those whom someone wishes to sue to 
expend resources to respond. It is important to locate the current debate 
about Twombly and Iqbal within this broader context of our 
constitutional values and traditions, which to date have generally been 
overlooked.
64
 
Rule 4(b) is also badly out of step with what came afterwards in 
constitutional law, as well as with long-standing Anglo-American 
tradition. In the years since 1938, Rule 4(b)’s approach of empowering 
creditors to commandeer state power to impose burdens on alleged 
debtors without appropriate due process protections has been repeatedly 
repudiated by a long line of Supreme Court cases.
65
 Rule 4(b) was 
drafted before this “due process revolution” of the 1970s recognized 
                                                                                                                     
 62. There are undoubtedly rejoinders to many of the constitutional arguments that I 
propose, but I will leave them to others. This is not only because the length of this Article 
already strains the patience of law review editors, but because my primary purpose is to locate 
Twombly within the context of history and values of constitutional dimension, and also to 
suggest that the problem of distorted incentives is better solved by Pre-Service Plausibility 
Determinations by the judiciary than by enhanced pleading requirements and motions to 
dismiss. 
 63. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (“The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the law.”). 
 64. For example, a distinguished proceduralist, Professor Arthur R. Miller, has recently 
published a long and impassioned defense of keeping the courts open to all comers no matter 
how unreasonable and unsupportable their charges may be, based primarily on the history of the 
Federal Rules. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3, 5, 127 (2010). Miller’s historical focus 
overlooks the fundamental countervailing constitutional principles of privacy (about which he 
has been passionate in other contexts) and that the state may not arbitrarily favor one group of 
citizens over another without a reasonable basis for doing so. Cf. Holmes, supra note 52, at 469 
(“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the 
time of Henry IV.”). Moreover, according to Miller, history apparently began in 1938 with the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, however, on this point the Federal 
Rules were a sharp and unwise departure from our long tradition that persons sued were also 
entitled to reasonable protection against an unwarranted invasion of their privacy. See infra Part 
II.B. 
 65. See infra Part II.C. 
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that the state has obligations to conduct an inquiry, appropriate to the 
circumstances, before imposing burdens on alleged debtors.
66
 However, 
Rule 4’s delegation of unsupervised power to creditors to impose 
substantial costs on alleged debtors without any quality control by the 
state has never been seriously reexamined in light of these subsequent 
constitutional developments. 
This Article uses the term “alleged debtor” or “person someone 
wants to sue” rather than “defendant” advisedly in an attempt to liberate 
the reader from the social construction—dare I say, “narrative”—
prevalent in our culture that “defendants” are always unscrupulous 
corporations and “plaintiffs” are all sick, impoverished, or injured 
workers or consumers who are seeking justice.
67
 The defining feature of 
procedure is its potential for reciprocal application. Evil corporations 
may also sue crusading scientists to coerce their silence.
68
 One cannot 
legitimately design rules of civil procedure by quietly assuming that 
plaintiffs are always the good guys and defendants are always the bad 
guys.
69
 
Rule 4(b) is indefensible as a matter of public policy and the public 
policy issues are even more important and clear-cut than the 
constitutional legalisms. Rule 4 not only allows unjustified impositions 
on individuals without a rational justification; at a systemic level, it 
creates economic incentives to oversupply litigation by encouraging the 
filing of cases that are not cost-justified by either their probability of 
success or their potential to develop law or facts in a socially useful 
way. The policy and constitutional issues are particularly serious when 
private parties with a financial stake in the outcome are empowered by 
the state to impose substantial costs on others that are not justified under 
existing facts or law in the hope that something may turn up. For this 
narrow category of cases, the “reasonable but speculative” cases, I 
suggest not only that a preliminary determination of reasonableness by 
government should be required, but also that the lawyer bringing the 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 4 (1991) (holding that the prejudgment 
attachment of real property without prior notice and hearing, exigent circumstances, or 
requirement to post a bond violates 14th Amendment due process); see also infra Part II.C. 
 67. See, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 25, at 475 (“[T]he Rules 
transferred power, in the form of access to information, from corporate defendants to individual 
plaintiffs.”); PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 
(1985) (detailing an asbestos company’s response to thousands of lawsuits brought by injured 
workers).  
 68. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL 
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 157–59 (2008). 
 69. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“But framing the problem in terms of 
assisting individual plaintiffs in their suits against corporate defendants is unsatisfactory. 
Discovery concededly may work to the disadvantage as well as to the advantage of individual 
plaintiffs. Discovery, in other words, is not a one-way proposition. It is available in all types of 
cases at the behest of any party, individual or corporate, plaintiff or defendant.”). 
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case should also generally be required to pay for the costs of a venture 
from which he or she will profit if successful.
70
 
II.  RULE 4(B) UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DELEGATES STATE POWER 
Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure delegates to any 
person in the United States (not only attorneys as officers of the court), 
without any judicial supervision whatsoever, the inherently 
governmental power to require any other person to stop whatever they 
are doing and appear in court upon pain of substantial financial 
penalties. Incredibly, this fearsome state power to summon any person 
to court to answer for anything upon threat of harsh financial penalties 
may be exercised merely by filling in three pieces of information on a 
government form: the plaintiff’s (or her attorney’s) name and address, 
and the defendant’s name.71 There is no reference at all in the current 
Rule 4 to the plausibility or legal sufficiency of the allegations of the 
complaint, nor is there any regular process for determining whether the 
grounds for suit are minimally sufficient on either the law or the facts. 
On the contrary, Rule 4(b) requires that the Clerk of Court “must” issue 
a summons, an official court order requiring the defendant to appear and 
answer upon pain of default, if two names and one address are filled in 
on a printed form that is available in the clerk’s office and a minimal 
filing fee (currently $350)
72
 is paid: “If the summons is properly 
completed, the clerk must sign, seal, and issue it to the plaintiff for 
service on the defendant.”73 
This is not a drafting glitch. Both the courts and the commentators 
agree that under current law, issuing the summons is a purely 
ministerial act by the clerk’s office that has no discretion to refuse to 
issue the summons.
74
 The government takes the plaintiff at its word and 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See infra Part III. 
 71.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1) (requiring that a summons “be directed to the defendant” and  
“state the name and address of the plaintiff’s attorney or—if unrepresented—of the plaintiff”). 
 72. From an incentive-based perspective, one of the problems with the filing fee is that 
there is no marginal cost for adding additional defendants (beyond the minimal cost for service). 
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that some defendants are named who have little or 
nothing to do with the matter. It costs the plaintiffs’ lawyer merely the nominal cost of service 
of process to name additional defendants, but many of them can be expected to pay nuisance 
value to settle.  
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(b) (emphasis added). 
 74. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 595 n.3 (3d Cir. 1966); 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1084 (2d ed. 1987) (“[The current 
rule] . . . makes it clear that the only formal requirement for the issuance of a summons is the 
filing of a valid complaint.”). The use of the word “valid” before the word “complaint” in the 
Wright and Miller treatise might be read to suggest that there is discretion under the existing 
rule for the clerk’s office to decline to issue a summons if it determines that the complaint is 
palpably deficient. While that is the result for which this Article argues, both the language of the 
present rule and the case law construing it would make it difficult to accomplish this result 
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automatically and without the regular exercise
75
 of any government 
review or discretion issues a court order summoning the person 
designated by the plaintiff to expend his resources to answer. 
As shown in the official appendix of forms, the federal form of 
summons used in every federal district court today says: 
The form summons is an official order from the court that states 
specifically that the defendant “must” answer the complaint. To 
emphasize its official character, it is signed by the Clerk of Court, a 
federal official, and bears the official seal of the court.
76
 It also makes a 
stern threat that the government will impose financial sanctions if the 
recipient disobeys (“judgment by default will be entered against you for 
the relief demanded in the complaint”).77 
Most American lawyers are so used to this system that it seems 
natural, and they take it for granted. One enlightened exception, 
however, is Philip K. Howard, who rightly points out that “[s]uing . . . is 
a use of government power against another free citizen . . . . Being sued 
                                                                                                                     
without a rule change. But cf. Mitchell v. Beaubouef, 581 F.2d 412, 414–15 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(holding that process must be served on the defendant where a prisoner’s pro se complaint is 
deemed legally sufficient under the liberal standard appropriate to pro se prisoner litigation).  
 75. See infra Part III for a discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), under which cases brought 
in forma pauperis are singled out for sua sponte review before service of process; see also 
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 76. The sign and seal are essential. Ayres v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565, 569–
70 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Requiring the Clerk to sign and issue the summons assures the defendant 
that the process is valid . . . . [A] summons not issued and signed by the Clerk with the seal of 
the court affixed thereto fails to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant even if properly 
served.”); accord 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.05 (2d ed. 1996) 
(“Under Rule 4(b) only the clerk may issue the summons . . . . [A] summons issued by the 
plaintiff’s attorney is a nullity.”); 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1084 (2d ed. 1987). 
 77. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 3 app. at 100. 
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is like being indicted for a crime, except that the penalty is money. 
Today in America, however, we let any self-interested person use that 
power without any significant check.”78 
Once that undeniable reality is made visible and we see the current 
Rule 4 system for what it is, we should recoil in horror and recognize 
that this practice, although so familiar in our legal culture that we may 
hardly be aware of it,
79
 is completely contrary to our constitutional 
traditions and values. The federal government is commanding
80
 
someone to appear in court based merely on a form being “properly 
completed” with names and addresses by a private party. That is not the 
prevailing practice in most state courts, where the service of a summons 
is not a court order but a private act by the plaintiff’s lawyer with no 
compulsory legal force or effect until a judge later decides whether to 
grant a default judgment based on the law and the facts.
81
 The federal 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Philip K. Howard, There Is No “Right to Sue,” WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, http://onlin 
e.wsj.com/article/0,,SB102807662822805480,00.html; see also WILLIAM A. ALDERSON, A 
PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL WRITS AND PROCESS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CASES 9 (1895) (“[S]ummonsing the party to answer to a complaint and enforcing a judgment 
were originally private acts, which were not authorized but only permitted by the state. Progress 
in the modes of judicial procedure resulted in rendering such acts those of the state, and the 
issuing and execution of all writs and process are now the exercise of state powers. This fact is 
important to remember in determining the validity of writs and process and the acts of the 
officer performed in executing them. Courts have too often been forgetful of this fact, which 
should constitute the premise of the argument, and have pronounced upon such matters as 
though the state had no concern therein.”); Philip K. Howard, Making Civil Justice Sane: Judges 
Should Stop Unreasonable Lawsuits Before They Start, CITY J., Spring 2006, http://www.city-
journal.org/printable.php?id=1989 (“Juries in a criminal case are our protection against abuses 
of state power. But a private lawsuit, we seem to have forgotten, is a use of state power against 
another private citizen. Filing a lawsuit is just like indicting someone—it’s just an indictment 
for money. Without the protection of a disinterested prosecutor and a grand jury, the defendant 
needs the protection of the judge to decide whether the claim has legal merit, leaving the jury to 
decide disputed facts.”). 
 79. It is a commonplace in cultural anthropology that a “culture” consists of those things 
that the people in it do not see because they take those things for granted. LUCILA L. SALCEDO ET 
AL., SOCIAL ISSUES 12 (1999) (“Culture also affects all the things that we take for granted and 
what we question.”); LARRY A. SAMOVAR & RICHARD E. PORTER, COMMUNICATION BETWEEN 
CULTURES 51 (1991) (“Culture is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes 
the members of one category of people from another.” (quoting GEERT HOFSTEDE, NATIONAL 
CULTURES AND CORPORATE CULTURES (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); EDGAR H. 
SCHEIN, THE CORPORATE CULTURE SURVIVAL GUIDE 19–20 (1999) (discussing shared mental 
models that members of an organization hold and take for granted). 
 80. William Feilden Craies, Summons, in 26 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 80 (11th ed. 
1911) (defining a summons as “(1) a command by a superior authority to attend at a given time 
or place or to do some public duty; (2) a document containing such command, and not 
infrequently also expressing the consequences entailed by neglect to obey”); see also Leas & 
McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510, 512 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1904) (distinguishing between a federal 
summons which orders the defendant to appear and summons in some states which merely 
provide notice of a claim but are not orders from the court to appear). 
 81. See infra notes 121–30 and accompanying text. 
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practice of ordering someone to court without any quality control is (1) 
an unwarranted departure from our historical tradition that a federal 
judge controls the basis upon which someone can be haled into court; 
(2) unconstitutional as an unreasonable seizure of the person of the 
alleged debtor; (3) a deprivation of private property without due process 
of law; and most clearly of all, (4) a standardless delegation of 
inherently governmental power to private individuals with a financial 
interest in misusing state power for their own private gain. For all of 
these reasons, Rule 4 should be revised to include a Pre-Service 
Plausibility Determination by the court prior to service of process, as is 
explained in the following Parts. 
A.  Rule 4 Deviates from Our Historical Tradition that a Federal Judge 
Controls the Grounds upon Which Someone May Be Summoned by the Court 
Rule 4 is a sharp departure from our Anglo-American tradition that 
the court, not private parties, defines regular and predictable grounds 
upon which someone can be summoned by the government to answer at 
law.
82
 
1.  The Original Understanding of the Court Order of Summons 
It was clearly established in both England
83
 and the colonies
84
 at the 
time of the Founding that common law courts had discretion to decline 
to issue a court order to summon the prospective defendant to court 
based on a pre-service review of the bona fides of the proposed lawsuit. 
As is described below, in the mid-nineteenth century, several states 
delegated the function of initiating a lawsuit to private lawyers
85
 and the 
Federal Rules followed in 1938 by taking the court entirely out of the 
                                                                                                                     
 82. That the state must define reasonable and predictable grounds upon which someone 
may be held to account is arguably the core meaning of clause 39 of Magna Carta, upon which 
our concept of “due process of law” is based: “No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or 
disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except 
by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” Magna Carta cl. 39 (1215), 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/medieval/magframe.asp (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 83. An 1890 decision by the Queen’s Bench, R v. Byrde, [1890] 63 Q.B. 645, reiterates 
this long-standing understanding. “The justices may . . . in the exercise of their discretion refuse 
to issue a summons, even though there is evidence before them of an alleged indictable 
misdemeanour, if they consider that the issue of the summons would be vexatious or improper.” 
Id. at 647 (citing R v. Ingham, (1849) 14 Q.B. 396)). The Byrde case involved forfeiture of 
statutory penalties for failure to construct a reservoir in a timely manner and thus it is debatable 
whether it is properly classified as a criminal or civil case. Id. at 646–47. However, since the 
same writs were used to summon the prospective defendant, this distinction seems not to have 
mattered. Id.  
 84. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (discussing the practice in colonial 
courts as described by Judge Betts in 1838). 
 85. See infra notes 122–30 and accompanying text. 
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loop.
86
 The original understanding at the time of the Founding, 
however, was clearly that the court, not counsel, controlled whether to 
summon someone to answer a civil lawsuit. 
According to a treatise written by federal district Judge Samuel 
Betts in the early nineteenth century, the practice in his court prior to 
the Revolution was for the plaintiff’s lawyer to appear in open court and 
state her case orally to the judge, who would then decide whether  to 
summon the person whom they wished to sue to answer.
87
 But even 
after the oral testing of the request for a writ of summons in open court 
fell into desuetude, there were still substantial safeguards in the form of 
a discretionary decision by either a judge or the clerk’s office, not the 
plaintiff or plaintiff’s lawyer, that process was warranted: 
In some cases the judge still considers and determines 
preliminarily the right of the party to coercive process, and 
in others subrogates the clerk to that office. And in no 
instance is the actor permitted to use the process of the 
court to institute or forward an action at his own 
discretion, nor without placing on the files a justificatory 
document (Rule 2). . . . When no order of the judge is filed, 
the clerk examines carefully the case made by the libel and 
the prayer of process, and gives the party such process as 
his libel will justify. . . . Although the process issues thus 
by act of court, yet it is taken out by the actor at his risk and 
responsibility.
88
 
The key concept is not whether the preliminary screening before 
service was oral or written (although I argue later that oral is better, 
because it allows probing questions). The main point is that a private 
party was “in no instance” entitled to a summons “at his own 
discretion” as is now routine under Rule 4. Rather, as of 1838, either the 
judge or the clerk “examine[d] carefully” the filing, and only gave the 
party an order of summons to serve on the proposed defendant if it was 
justified.  
While Judge Betts was writing a treatise about admiralty, he was a 
federal district judge sitting in general jurisdiction. Throughout his 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See infra notes 114–21 and accompanying text. 
 87. SAMUEL R. BETTS, A SUMMARY OF PRACTICE IN INSTANCE, REVENUE AND PRIZE 
CAUSES, IN THE ADMIRALTY COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 
NEW YORK; AND ALSO ON APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT: TOGETHER WITH THE RULES OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT 23–24 (1838) (“In this district process emanates from the court correspondent 
to the libellant’s case. The actual practice for a half century was to read the libel in open court, 
and thereupon pray and receive directions for the appropriate process. This direct agency of the 
court has been discontinued since the revolution, but the principle upon which the usage was 
founded, yet enters into and influences the practice.”). 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
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treatise he routinely noted significant differences between the practices 
in ordinary civil cases as opposed to admiralty. No such differences are 
mentioned on this point, which strongly suggests that a similar practice, 
under which judges or the clerk’s office exercised discretion before 
issuing a writ of summons, also applied in other civil cases. There is, 
moreover, no logical reason why the clerk’s “duty” only to issue such 
process as was justified (as Judge Betts puts it) would be restricted to 
admiralty cases only.
89
 
Similarly, another federal district judge, Alfred Conkling,
90
 writing 
a generation later, shortly before the Civil War, also explained that 
either the judge or the clerk’s office made a substantive review before 
granting a request for a writ of summons to compel someone to appear 
and answer. After quoting portions of the passage from Judge Betts also 
quoted above, that “[w]hen no order of the judge is filed, the clerk 
examines carefully the case made by the libel and the prayer of process, 
and gives the party such process as his libel will justify,” Judge 
Conkling goes on to observe: 
Such is the course of proceeding supposed to have been 
contemplated by the above recited [1844 Supreme Court 
admiralty] rule. Except in those cases which require the 
previous order of the court directing the issue of process, 
the mere delivery or transmission of the libel to the clerk is 
all that the rule requires. But the duty thus imposed upon 
this officer demands vigilance and intelligence on his part; 
for he cannot lawfully issue any process, until, by an 
examination of the libel, he has ascertained that the matter 
of complaint is in its nature cognizable in a court of 
admiralty; that the libellant is, prima facie, entitled to 
redress, and that the particular form of process prayed for 
in the libel is adapted to the case.
91
 
Judge Conkling’s statement is even stronger than Judge Betts’: he 
maintains that examining and testing the complaint was not only the 
prevailing practice, but that it is legally required before the clerk may 
“lawfully issue” process and therefore that it must be read into the rules. 
In addition, Judge Conkling makes clear that the review before issuance 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C.W.D. Wis. 1884), 
an ordinary, non-admiralty civil case between two paper companies involving garnishment of a 
debt, in which the court stated, “It is no doubt the policy of the law to keep process under the 
immediate supervision and control of the court.” Id. at 254 (emphasis added). 
 90. Conkling served as a federal district judge in the northern district of New York from 
1825 to 1852. History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/ 
nGetInfo?jid=490&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 91. 2 ALFRED CONKLING, THE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 71–72 (1857). 
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of the summons was not only for formal defects but must also to 
confirm that the person suing is “prima facie entitled to redress.” 
This existing discretion to decline to issue a writ of summons was 
incorporated by reference into the procedures of the federal courts by 
the original 1789 Judiciary Act, which created the lower federal courts. 
Section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act authorized the federal courts to 
issue writs, including writs of summons, but only on terms “agreeable to 
the principles and usages of law.”92 This was understood to mean “those 
general principles, and those general usages, which are to be found, not 
in the legislative acts of any particular state, but in that generally 
recognised and long established law, (the common law,) which forms 
the substratum of the laws of every state.”93 In other words, existing 
English and colonial practice, including preliminary review of 
complaints for plausibility before issuance of summons, was 
incorporated by reference as a condition by the section of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 that authorized federal courts to issue writs of summons in 
the first place. 
But the First and Second Congresses were not content with this 
indirect reference to existing understandings and practices regarding 
pre-service review by the court of requests for summons. In the Process 
Act of 1792,
94
 Congress specifically legislated that the federal judiciary 
must control the issuance of writs, including the writ of summons. On 
most procedural matters, the early Congresses simply mandated that the 
federal courts follow existing state procedures, but the founding 
generation thought this one thing important enough to impose it 
separately regardless of state practice: a federal judge had to “test” 
(certify) and the clerk had to sign every writ personally, not delegate 
that right to a plaintiff’s lawyer, even though that was already the 
practice in some state systems.
95
 As one of their first acts establishing 
the federal courts, the First and Second Congresses enacted the 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (“And be it further enacted, That 
all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire 
facias, habeas corpus,(e) and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be 
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and 
usages of law.”). 
 93. THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BEING A VIEW OF THE PRACTICE AND 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL POINTS DECIDED 
143 (2d ed. 1830). 
 94. Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275 (1792).  
 95. See Dwight v. Merritt, 4 F. 614, 614–16 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880) (holding that a 
summons issued by a lawyer pursuant to state practice is invalid to compel someone to answer 
in federal court).  
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following statute requiring all processes issued by district courts, 
including writs of summons, to “bear test of the judge.”96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The statutory command of 1792 that the district judges “test” 
process before issuing writs gradually reified into a formal requirement 
to include a teste, an attestation clause witnessing the document.
97
 But 
the statutory requirement that the judge sign off on process before it 
issued is still important,
98
 just as signing a contract is important to 
signify that one has adopted its terms. The statutory requirement that the 
judge test and the clerk issue, seal, and sign means that issuing process, 
including a writ of summons, was a discretionary act by the United 
States,
99
 and not a power granted to the plaintiff’s lawyer. The federal 
statute just cited was understood throughout the nineteenth and early 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 275 (1792). This followed verbatim in 
relevant part a statute enacted on a temporary basis by the First Congress in 1789 a few months 
after ratification of the Constitution. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 1, 1 Stat. 93 (1789). 
 97. “The teste of a writ is the concluding clause, commencing with the word witness, &c.” 
2 JOHN BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 562 (2d ed. 1843). 
 98. ALDERSON, supra note 78, at 70 (“Once the seal was everything, the signature nothing. 
In modern times the signature is regarded at least as of much importance as the seal. . . . The 
signature is independent evidence of the authorized delegation of the power of state in judicial 
proceedings.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); see also Ins. Co. v. Hallock, 73 U.S. (6 
Wall.) 556, 558 (1868) (invalidating title to land purchased at sheriff’s sale because writ under 
which sale had been conducted had not been properly sealed); Id. at 561 (“Without the seal it is 
void. We cannot distinguish it from any other writ or process in this particular.”). 
 99. See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252, 253–54 (C.C.W.D. Wis. 
1884) (“The summons, notice, writ, or whatever it may be called, by virtue of which a defendant 
is required to come into court and answer, litigate his rights, and submit to the personal 
judgment of the court, must be ‘process within the meaning of the law of congress’ and the rule 
of the court, which is to be issued by the clerk of this court, under the seal of the court and tested 
in the name of the chief justice of the United States. . . . It is no doubt the policy of the law to 
keep process under the immediate supervision and control of the court.” (third emphasis 
added)). 
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twentieth centuries to establish a federal policy to keep issuance of a 
summons to answer in court “under the immediate supervision and 
control of the court.”100 The clear understanding from the Founding 
until 1938 was that federal judges and court clerks had a responsibility 
to satisfy themselves that it was reasonable to order the proposed 
defendant to come to court to answer before doing so.
101
  
Sadly, however, some federal judges wanted to avoid what they 
evidently considered the tedious work of reviewing complaints before 
service. Without the modern institution of magistrate judges
102
 to assist 
them, the review of complaints to determine whether writs of summons 
should issue was delegated to the clerk’s office and, because assistant 
court clerks (many of whom are not even lawyers) do not typically have 
the training or breadth of vision of federal district judges or magistrate 
judges, review of complaints before service gradually became more 
technical and formalistic, and less substantive. A treatise from 1895 
devotes over sixty-four pages to considering various formal defects in 
issuing process, and whether they void the court’s jurisdiction, or are 
merely voidable, and hence subject to correction by amendment.
103
 
One of the principal drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Professor Edson Sunderland, noted in a 1909 article that 
review by the clerk’s office was not limited to matters of form or 
whether proper allegations had been made in the complaint. Sunderland 
states, “[I]t is within the discretion of the court to allow or refuse the 
issuance of summons after a long delay.”104 In other words, where it 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Id. at 254 (emphasis added). 
 101. See W.S. SIMKINS, A FEDERAL SUIT AT LAW 22 (1912) (“Form of process for the 
commencement of suits is controlled by the conformity act, except as to the official signature, 
seal and test, which . . . is required to all writs and processes issuing from the courts of the 
United States. Congress having thus legislated as to the process, it must be followed, though the 
State law permitted an attorney to issue the summons.” (citations omitted)). 
 102. Congress created the system of magistrates (now called “Magistrate Judges”) in the 
Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1115 (1968), a generation after the 
Federal Rules. However, a system of “United States Commissioners” had existed since 1793 to 
try petty offenses, issue search and arrest warrants, set bail and the like. See Landmark Judicial 
Legislation, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_19.html 
(last visited May 2, 2012). Commissioners were limited by background and experience to 
criminal cases, id., and there appears to be no evidence that the possibility of using 
commissioners or magistrate judges rather than assistant clerks to screen cases was considered 
by the drafters of Rule 4. Today, “[a]s a practical matter, the sub-judiciary has become 
indispensable. Federal judges likely could not manage their caseloads effectively without 
delegating some tasks to magistrates and special masters.” BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., 
supra note 25, at 683. 
 103. ALDERSON, supra note 78, at 23–88; see also Current Decisions, Process—
Amendment—Void Summons Not Amendable, 32 YALE L. J. 297 (1923). 
 104. Edson R. Sunderland, Process, in 32 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 412, 426 
(William Mack ed., 1909) (citing Steves v. Carson, 40 P. 569 (Colo. 1895); Reese v. Kirby, 68 
Ga. 825 (1882)). 
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was apparent from a preliminary review of the complaint that a long 
time had passed between the events forming the basis for suit and the 
filing of a case, courts in the nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century had clear discretion to refuse to issue a summons. That practice, 
which has now been “superseded,”105 compares favorably with the case 
of Ward v. Arm & Hammer,
106
 in which the clerk’s office, acting under 
the edict of “modern” Rule 4(b), mechanically issued a summons 
requiring a company to spend ten months defending against patently 
frivolous charges, despite it also being apparent on the face of the 
complaint that the statute of limitations had long since run.
107
 
The practice of pre-service review of complaints described in the 
treatises is also confirmed by the few pre-1938 appellate decisions that 
discuss this issue. Historical records of the practices of courts in 
declining to issue writs of summons are not easily available. There 
would typically be no written record of these discretionary decisions by 
judges and clerks except in the rare instances in which a disappointed 
plaintiff whose papers had been rejected brought an appeal to a higher 
court and the appellate court wrote and published an opinion. Several 
such reported appellate decisions do confirm, however, that the 
prevailing practice prior to 1938 was for courts to reject requests for 
summons for a variety of deficiencies, both substantive and formal. 
The 1913 decision by the First Circuit in In re Kinney
108
 is 
illustrative. In that case, a prominent Pennsylvania inventor, investor 
and frequent pro se litigant brought a contract suit against a company in 
federal court in Massachusetts.
109
 When his request for a writ of 
summons was rejected by the clerk of court, he requested the district 
judge to order the clerk to issue the summons. The district judge upheld 
the clerk’s refusal to issue the summons in an unpublished opinion. The 
disappointed litigant then attempted to mandamus the district judge in 
the First Circuit, which also denied his request for a summons, “because 
the proposed writs ‘were not made returnable at the proper return 
day.’”110 However, the First Circuit’s opinion strongly suggests that 
there were additional, more substantive reasons as well as formal 
defects: “It is not necessary for us to examine the reasons given by the 
judge of the District Court beyond this, because this was a sufficient 
reason for his refusal.”111 
                                                                                                                     
 105. See infra notes 135–38 and accompanying text (describing how Rule 4 was claimed to 
supersede the 1792 Process Act). 
 106. 341 F. Supp. 2d 499 (D.N.J. 2004). 
 107. Id. at 500, 502 n.4; supra notes 25–37 and accompanying text. 
 108. 202 F. 137 (1st Cir. 1913). 
 109. For more information about the underlying dispute, see Kinney v. Plymouth Rock 
Squab Co., 214 F. 766 (1st Cir. 1914). It appears that Kinney was a frequent litigant. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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Another route by which the practice of the clerk’s office in declining 
to issue summonses could come to light was if a disappointed litigant 
sued the clerk for damages. The 1905 case of United States ex rel. 
Kinney v. Bell
112
 illustrates this route. In that case, the same pro se 
litigant referred to above, Robert D. Kinney, sued the clerk of the 
Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and his sureties, on his bond for refusing to issue a 
summons in a case that Kinney desired to bring against several state 
court judges who had ruled against him. In this instance, the refusal by 
the clerk’s office to issue a summons was clearly because of a 
substantive defect: lack of federal jurisdiction. The Third Circuit held 
that Kinney had not suffered any legal damage; the clerk had properly 
refused to issue a writ of summons because there was no colorable 
allegation of federal jurisdiction.
113
 
2.  The “Reforms” of 1938 
The stern insistence in Rule 4 that the clerk “must” issue a court 
order to appear if a simple form is filled out correctly was no accident; 
it was an overreaction by the drafters in 1938 against the then-prevailing 
practice of assistant clerks rejecting complaints for a variety of formal 
defects. But Rule 4 threw out the baby with the bathwater by completely 
abrogating judicial control over the grounds for haling someone into 
court. 
Charles E. Clark, then-Dean of the Yale Law School and the 
principal drafter of the Rules, wanted to go even further. He originally 
proposed “the New York system” in which private attorneys serve the 
complaint on prospective defendants and only thereafter file it with the 
court.
114
 Dean Clark thought that this system “work[ed] quite 
satisfactorily,” but according to him, the practicing bar objected that it 
“seemed undignified and over-simple.”115 
They called it the “hip pocket rule” in which attorneys could sue 
without filing anything with the court until later when some action was 
                                                                                                                     
 112. 135 F. 336 (3d Cir. 1905). 
 113. Id. at 339–40 (“‘The questions sought to be presented in this case relate to the 
interpretation to be given to a law of the state, and the complaint is that this law is being 
misinterpreted and misapplied, to the injury of the plaintiff in his rights of property. In all such 
cases, where there is not the requisite diverse citizenship and amount in controversy to give the 
court jurisdiction, the remedy for the injuries complained of is in the state courts.’ As, then, the 
Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the proposed action against the state judges, it follows that 
the use plaintiff, Kinney, sustained no legal injury whatever by the clerk’s noncompliance with 
his præcipe, and failure to file his papers.” (quoting Kiernan v. Multnomah Cnty., 95 F. 849, 
849–50 (C.C.D. Or. 1899))). 
 114. See Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15 
TENN. L. REV. 551, 563–64 (1939). 
 115. Id. at 564 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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requested of the court.
116
 The compromise that ultimately resulted 
required the complaint to be filed with the court, but removed the 
court’s discretion not to issue the summons. It was a political 
compromise that combined aspects of the New York and federal 
systems but in an untenable way. Like the federal practice of the time, a 
lawsuit was initiated by filing a complaint with the federal court and the 
clerk’s office would issue a summons in the form of a federal court 
order. But as in some state systems, the clerk’s office had to issue the 
summons as a matter of course without any preliminary review by the 
court before an order to appear was issued. 
In an article published a year after the new Federal Rules were 
adopted, Dean Clark described the new system succinctly but without 
any apparent awareness of the problems that this new hybrid had 
created: “You start a suit by taking your complaint to the clerk, and the 
clerk issues the summons and the summons and complaint are served by 
a marshal.”117 There was no attention at all to the incentive structure for 
strike suits created or the constitutional issues of ordering someone to 
report to court to answer even implausible charges. In fact, with evident 
impatience at what he evidently regarded as the unthinking 
conservatism of the bar about anything with which they were 
unfamiliar, Clark described the final compromise as “long on dignity” 
and he believed it adopted “the original procedure in the Federal 
Courts” merely because “that was the more familiar system throughout 
the country.”118 An outline for a September 1937 speech to the 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. The full context of Clark’s description of what occurred is as follows: 
Now, I want to run over a few of the more striking things in the early part 
of the Rules, and, of course, there is not time to go into great detail. The first 
general matter is the way suit is commenced. We had much discussion about 
this matter. The New Yorkers wanted their system, which is simple service of 
summons on the opposing side, with an exchange of pleadings between the 
parties, and with the Court not in the case at all, until some action is asked of it. 
Under the New York system, therefore, a case can go forward very far before 
the Court or any of its officers, even the clerk, may know it exists. It is a very 
simple system, and I think it works quite satisfactorily. 
To many lawyers this system seemed undignified and over-simple. It came 
to be dubbed the “hip-pocket rule,” because one lawyer said, “Why, that is just 
a case where the lawyer carries around the case in his hip-pocket,” since the 
lawyer would have the pleadings and they would not be filed in the Court until 
some action was requested of the Court. That was one of the alternative plans 
we suggested in the preliminary draft. Due to the objections of lawyers, who 
were long on dignity, however, we adopted the original procedure in the 
Federal Courts, to-wit: that an action is started by filing the complaint with the 
clerk, and the court’s process is issued by the clerk and served by a marshal. 
That is provided here at the beginning, Rule 3 and Rule 4. You start a suit by 
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American Bar Association by the Chair of the Rules Committee, former 
Attorney General William D. Mitchell, tells essentially the same 
story.
119
  
In fact, however, Clark failed to mention that at least some members 
of the bar wanted to keep the court in the loop for reasons more 
substantive than mere “dignity.” Irvin H. Fathchild, a prominent 
Chicago attorney, argued that requiring a summons to emanate from the 
court, rather than from a private party, would eliminate a lot of suits 
“which never would have been filed if the court filing was required as 
an official step in litigation.”120 
                                                                                                                     
taking your complaint to the clerk, and the clerk issues the summons and the 
summons and complaint are served by a marshal. There is a provision in Rule 
4(c) that special appointments in place of the marshal shall be made freely 
when substantial savings in trial fees will result, but the procedure indicated is 
the one that was the more familiar system throughout the country. 
Id. at 563–64. 
 119.  William D. Mitchell, Outline of Address on Proposed Federal Rules Civil Procedure 
Before the Judicial Section of the American Bar Association (Sept. 1937), from the Clark Papers 
at Yale University Library (on file with author). 
In the preliminary draft we presented two alternative methods of beginning an 
action. One provided that to begin a suit it is necessary to file a complaint with 
the clerk of court, have summons issued under the seal of the court and 
delivered to the marshal for service, and that all other pleadings and papers 
must be filed as well as served. The other method proposed was that permitted 
in many code states, which allows the lawyers to prepare the summons and 
complaint in their own offices and serve them without filing, and allows all 
papers to be withheld from the files until the point is reached at which some 
judicial action is asked for. All those members of the Advisory Committee who 
had practiced under the latter system favored it. Those members who had not 
practiced under this system were either opposed to it or doubtful. The reaction 
from the profession has been overwhelmingly in favor of the first system, 
which requires the complaint to be filed when the action is commenced. The 
Advisory Committee in its last draft has, therefore, adopted this system. Those 
of us who have practiced under the other yielded reluctantly. We know that the 
more informal system is more convenient, saves time and results in a saving of 
expense in cases which are settled or dismissed without judicial action, and we 
know from experience that the prediction of the opponents of this system of 
abuses and dire consequences that will flow from it are not borne out by actual 
experience in those states where this system is used. Nevertheless, it is after all 
largely a matter of speed and convenience, and as the bar of the country seems 
to prefer the more formal system, the Advisory Committee have recommended 
it to the Court. 
Id. It is not entirely clear whether Mitchell actually delivered the remarks verbatim or whether 
Clark or someone else merely prepared the outline of talking points for him as background for 
his speech, but for our purposes, it hardly matters as either way the Mitchell outline shows the 
drafters’ contemporary understanding. 
 120. Box 101 in Clark Papers at Yale University Library. 
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The drafters of Rule 4 were forced by opposition from the bar into a 
political compromise that amalgamated two different systems into a 
new constitutionally unsustainable hybrid. Under the option originally 
proposed and preferred by the drafters of the Rules, Rule 4 would have 
incorporated the New York system for initiating a lawsuit. They 
believed that system of private notice but no court order to appear, used 
by several states including New York, was constitutional and did not 
involve the flaws in the current federal system identified in this Article 
because under the New York system, state power does not become 
involved in ordering someone to court without assessing the bona fides 
of a proposed lawsuit. Rather, the service of the complaint is a private 
act performed by an agent of the plaintiff and merely notifies the 
prospective defendant that the action is about to be brought, how to 
appear to answer it, and what the potential consequences of failing to 
appear might be. As Dean Clark described it in his 1939 article, under 
the New York system, “the Court [is] not in the case . . . until some 
action is asked of it.”121 
That difference between the federal practice of issuing a writ of 
summons as a court order, and the practice in some states of merely 
providing a private notice of suit from the plaintiffs’ attorney, was 
explained in 1904 in Leas & McVitty v. Merriman: 
[T]he word “process,” as used in Rev. St. § 911 [the 
successor to the 1792 federal quoted above], means an 
order of court, although it may be issued by the clerk. The 
summons in a common-law action, which is, I think, a 
“process” in the name of the court commands the sheriff or 
marshal to summon the defendant, etc. The writs of scire 
facias, fieri facias, habeas corpus, subpoenas for witnesses, 
subpoenas duces tecum, writs of certiorari, supersedeas, 
attachments, and of venire facias are all commands or 
orders of court that something be done. In equity the writ of 
subpoena, and in criminal cases the bench warrant, 
command that something be done. Now, the notices under 
the Code are in no sense commands or orders of court. They 
are mere notices that the plaintiff will on some specified 
rule day file the declaration, or make a motion in 
court. . . .  
In several of the states a summons in an action may be 
issued by the plaintiff’s attorney. And in at least the 
majority of such states it is held that a summons is not a 
process. This conclusion is based on the fact that in such 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Clark, supra note 114, at 564. 
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states the summons is not issued by the court, and is not an 
order of court.
122 
 
Today that may strike some as a distinction without a difference, but at 
the time the federal rules were drafted, it was thought that there was a 
basic difference between the New York system, which did not involve 
the power of the state until later, and the federal system, in which the 
defendant was issued an official court order requiring him or her to 
come to court. 
                                                                                                                     
 122. 132 F. 510, 513 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1904) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also 
Shepard v. Adams, 168 U.S. 618, 624 (1898) (“The state Code of Colorado provides that civil 
actions shall be commenced by the issuing of a summons or the filing of a complaint; that the 
summons may be issued by the clerk of the court or by the plaintiff’s attorney; it may be signed 
by the plaintiff’s attorney; it may be served by a private person not a party to the suit. All writs 
and process issuing from a Federal court must be under the seal of the court and signed by the 
clerk, and bear teste of the judge of the court from which they issue. The processes and writs 
must be served by the marshal or by his regularly appointed deputies.” (citation omitted)). 
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For example, the current New York state form of summons, like that 
in many states, provides
123
:Note that the New York summons, unlike 
the federal one, is not signed by the court, but merely by the attorney for 
the plaintiff. In addition, the summons is not served by an officer of the 
state like a federal marshal, but rather may be served by any person over 
eighteen who is not a party to the action.
124
 Most importantly, the New 
York form of summons is not a court order to appear. Rather, it is 
merely notice by the plaintiff’s attorney that if the person sued fails to 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Starting a Case, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/forms/ 
summons.pdf (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 124. Starting a Case, NEW YORK ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc 
/civil/starting.shtml#issuance (last visited May 2, 2012). 
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appear, the plaintiff intends to apply to the court for a judgment by 
default against them. All of the constitutional issues raised in this 
Article depend upon state action, which is arguably not present in a state 
system such as New York’s because the court is not involved until later 
when a default judgment is entered. 
After service in the New York system, the complaint is “returned” 
to court and the lawsuit and the state’s involvement begins. If the 
defendant declines to appear and answer, the court may enter a default 
judgment against the defendant. But note that entering default judgment 
is a judicial act, performed by a judge or sometimes a clerk acting under 
judicial supervision. And most importantly for our purposes, a default 
judgment may not be entered without state scrutiny of the bona fides of 
both the law and the facts.
125
 Thus, unlike the federal system created by 
the 1938 Rules, the system of commencing a lawsuit by private notice 
as opposed to court order currently in effect in New York and some 
other states arguably does not involve state action to seize someone and 
order them to appear, but rather state power is involved only after the 
court decides whether or not to enter a default judgment,
126
 although of 
course in practice the result is much the same. 
None of the arguments in this Article depend on whether particular 
state systems for initiating lawsuits are also unconstitutional. But it 
should be acknowledged that it has long been maintained in law that 
federal and state practices for commencing a lawsuit are different. The 
leading case is Dwight v. Merritt.
127
 In that case, a hapless New York 
lawyer attempted to initiate a lawsuit in federal court using the New 
York practice for private issuance of summons signed by the attorney 
rather than the court.
128
 The court held, however, that the federal 
statutory requirement for the court to issue an order of summons was a 
jurisdictional requirement: 
In this case an attempt has been made to commence a suit 
at common law, in this [federal] court, by serving on the 
defendant a paper purporting to be a summons, in the form 
prescribed by the statute of New York for commencing a 
civil action. It is signed by the plaintiffs’ attorney, but is 
                                                                                                                     
 125. See, for example, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3215(a) (McKinney 2007), which provides upon 
failure to appear, the clerk shall enter default judgment for a sum certain but only “upon 
submission of the requisite proof.” 
 126. It is true that the state typically tells the plaintiff in advance what the plaintiff is going 
to need to do to acquire jurisdiction and get a default. But that advance notice to the plaintiff of 
what is going to be required later to show that the prospective defendant received fair notice 
does not raise any of the federal constitutional issues raised by the present federal practice of 
officially ordering the defendant to court. 
 127. 4 F. 614 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1880). 
 128. Id. at 614–15. 
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not under the seal of the court, nor is it signed by the clerk 
of the court. Section 911 of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States provides that “all writs and processes issuing 
from the courts of the United States shall be under the seal 
of the court from which they issue, and shall be signed by 
the clerk thereof.” A summons, or notice to the defendant, 
for the commencement of a suit, is certainly process, quite 
as much as a capias or a subpoena to appear and answer is 
process. The statute intends that all process shall issue from 
the court, where such process is to be held to be the action 
of the court, and that the evidence that it issues from the 
court and is the action of the court shall be the seal of the 
court and the signature of the clerk. It is clear that a 
signature by the plaintiffs’ attorney, without a seal, and an 
issuing from the office of such attorney, cannot be 
substituted.
129
 
For the purposes of this Article, the important point is that Rule 4 as 
it now exists is a sharp departure from the methods of initiating a 
lawsuit that prevailed historically in both the federal and New York 
state systems. In the federal system, summons was an official court 
order to appear, but it was preceded by a preliminary review by a court 
official to determine that it was justified. In some state systems, 
initiating a lawsuit was a private action by the plaintiff’s lawyer merely 
to put the prospective defendant on notice.
130
 The state did not become 
involved until later, when the complaint was returned and state decided, 
based on the facts and the law, whether a default judgment was 
justified. Clark and the other drafters thought this distinction made a 
difference, although today that may not seem so clear. But whether or 
not particular state systems are also unconstitutional would have to be 
analyzed state by state, and that is outside the scope of this Article. 
What is clear is that the new federal system of 1938, in which the 
government must order the defendant to appear regardless of the merit 
or lack thereof of the plaintiff’s claims, was neither fish nor fowl. 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Id. 
 130. Admittedly, not all state systems for summons still follow the New York model. 
Under the pernicious influence of Rule 4, some may have adopted the federal model in which 
the state delegates to the plaintiffs’ attorney the power of the state to issue an official order 
compelling the person sued to appear without any government quality control. If so, these 
models are also unconstitutional. One would have to assess them individually, just as state pre-
judgment attachment systems had to be assessed and amended individually in the wake of 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969). But it has long been 
held that state systems for summoning persons to answer in court are subject to constitutional 
due process restrictions. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
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The drafters of the Federal Rules that were promulgated in 1938 
certainly must have known that they were abrogating a long tradition by 
making the issuance of a court order of summons automatic and 
nondiscretionary under Rule 4.
131
 With cryptic understatement, the 1937 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4(b) recites merely that “U.S.C., 
Title 28, § 721 [now § 1691] (Sealing and testing of writs) is 
substantially continued insofar as it applies to a summons, but its 
requirements as to teste of process are superseded.”132 
One might question how honest a characterization it was for the 
drafters to say that Rule 4(b) “substantially continued” the provisions of 
the 1792 statute. Rule 4(b) actually totally abrogated long-standing 
judicial discretion not to issue a summons and delegated the decision 
instead to the person suing (or more practically, that person’s lawyer). 
This fundamental shift, which put state power in private control, was 
not even mentioned in the 1937 Advisory Committee note. 
This aspect of the new Rules was incorporated without controversy. 
No one noted the constitutional issues (which, in fairness, did not 
become prominent until the “due process revolution” of the 1970s). 
After the Rules were adopted, several of the drafters wrote journal 
articles and delivered speeches describing the significant changes 
wrought by the new Rules. None of these shows any awareness that a 
fundamental change had been made in the incentive structure for 
litigation by delegating the unsupervised power to private parties to 
issue court orders requiring others to appear in court to answers charges. 
In a 1939 article provocatively titled “Fundamental Changes 
Effected by the New Federal Rules,”133 Dean Charles E. Clark, who 
served as Reporter for the Rules Advisory Committee, began with a 
telling remark that reveals his general approach: “[P]rocedural rules are 
but means to an end, means to the enforcement of substantive 
justice . . . .”134 Clark goes on to describe many aspects of the then-new 
Rules in detail, but the process for issuing a writ of summons receives 
only the briefest passing mention: “You start a suit by taking your 
complaint to the clerk, and the clerk issues the summons and the 
summons and complaint are served by a marshal.”135 There is no 
intimation that the phrase “the clerk issues the summons” papered over 
                                                                                                                     
 131. One of the most influential of the drafters, Professor Edson Sunderland of the 
University of Michigan, had even written about the power of courts to refuse to serve summons 
in patently frivolous cases. Sunderland, supra note 104, at 426 (“[I]t is within the discretion of 
the court to allow or refuse the issuance of summons after a long delay.”). 
 132. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee’s note (1937). 
 133. Clark, supra note 114, at 551. 
 134. Id.; see also STEVEN N. SUBRIN, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The 
Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 115, 115–52 
(Peninah Petruck ed., 1991). 
 135. Clark, supra note 114, at 564. 
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a significant change or that the new process impinged upon long-
standing traditions and constitutional values. 
Another academic who served on the drafting committee, Professor 
Armistead M. Dobie of the University of Virginia Law School, who 
later served as a judge on the Fourth Circuit, acknowledged at least 
obliquely that the court no longer had authority to review the complaint 
before issuing a summons: “Process, in the form of a summons, is 
issued by the clerk as a matter of course and is served on the defendant 
together with a copy of the summons.”136 The “as a matter of course” 
language may have been drawn from former Equity Rule 12 of 1912,
137
 
which is cited in the 1937 Advisory Committee note to Rule 3.
138
 
However, it is clear that a subpoena issued under Equity Rule 12 still 
required teste by the district judge under the 1792 statute.
139
 The 
significance of the 1938 changes was the elimination of review by the 
court before issuance of a court order to appear, and thereby the implicit 
repeal of the 1792 statute by the adoption of Rule 4. 
In abolishing pre-service review of complaints by judges and the 
clerk’s office prior to service in 1938, the drafters of the Federal Rules 
may have felt that they were striking a blow against formalism and legal 
technicalities and ensuring that cases would be decided on their merits. 
But this “reform” brings to mind Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s admonition 
that “[e]very reform, however necessary, will by weak minds be carried 
to an excess, that itself will need reforming.”140 It is one thing to say 
that the clerk’s office should not reject complaints for formal defects 
that do not affect substantive rights, and quite another to provide that a 
court order of summons must be issued at the behest of a self-interested 
private party in every case without any regard to the merits of the claims 
presented. A more sensible, moderate amendment to Rule 5 in 1993 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 264 
(1939) (emphasis added). 
 137. Former Equity Rule 12 of 1912 provided:  
Whenever a bill is filed, and not before, the clerk shall issue the process of 
subpoena thereon, as of course, upon the application of the plaintiff, which 
shall contain the names of the parties and be returnable into the clerk’s office 
twenty days from the issuing thereof. At the bottom of the subpoena shall be 
placed a memorandum, that the defendant is required to file his answer or other 
defense in the clerk’s office on or before the twentieth day after service, 
excluding the day thereof; otherwise the bill may be taken pro confesso.  
Former Equity Rule 12 of 1912, reprinted in CHARLES C. MONTGOMERY, MONTGOMERY’S 
MANUAL OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 911 (1914) (emphasis added), available at http://www.archi 
ve.org/stream/manualoffederalp00montiala/manualoffederalp00montiala_djvu.txt (last visited 
May 2, 2012). 
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 3 advisory committee’s note (1937). 
 139. MONTGOMERY, supra note 137, § 913. 
 140. COLERIDGE, supra note 1, at 26.  
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specifically prohibited the clerk’s office from rejecting papers for 
formal defects.
141
 But that moderate approach of overlooking formal 
defects was not the approach adopted in the 1938 Rules, which instead 
completely eliminated judicial involvement in issuing court orders to 
appear and defend. 
The change in judicial attitude toward “largely groundless 
claim[s]”142 before and after the 1938 rule change is palpable. In a 1933 
decision, the Tenth Circuit had proclaimed: 
A court has inherent power to determine whether its 
process is used for the purpose of vexation or fraud, instead 
of the single purpose for which it is intended—the 
adjudication of bona fide controversies. It is the duty of the 
court to prevent such abuse, and a dismissal of the cause is 
an appropriate way to discharge that duty.
143
 
A few years later, however, under new Rule 4, the focus had shifted 
away from preventing abuse of the court’s processes to enforcing the 
newly created “right” under Rule 4 for every plaintiff to have her 
complaint served on whatever persons she wished to sue, regardless of 
patent lack of merit or an evident purpose to harass. An illustrative case 
is Dear v. Rathje, a 1973 per curiam decision by the Seventh Circuit.
144
 
In that case the plaintiff was a vindictive ex-wife (Ms. Dear) who had 
previously filed numerous pro se cases against her ex-husband (Mr. 
Dear) and his new wife. The complaint in question was a civil rights 
claim in federal court against the state court judge who had previously 
enjoined Ms. Dear from picketing Mr. Dear’s place of employment, and 
also the lawyer who had represented the husband in that prior case, and 
Mr. Dear’s new wife. The clerk’s office referred the complaint to a 
district judge, who after reviewing the grounds proposed for suit and 
taking judicial notice of a “series” of Ms. Dear’s numerous prior cases 
against her ex-husband and others allegedly acting in concert with him 
to conspire against her, dismissed the case sua sponte prior to service.
145
 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See Farzana K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2007) (“By 
refusing to accept complaints (or notices of appeal) for filing, clerks may prevent litigants from 
satisfying time limits. To prevent this—to ensure that judges rather than administrative staff 
decide whether a document is adequate—Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(e) was amended in 1993 to require 
clerks to accept documents tendered for filing. The last sentence of this rule provides: ‘The clerk 
shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not 
presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or practices.’”). 
 142.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v.  
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143. Pueblo de Taos v. Archuleta, 64 F.2d 807, 813 (10th Cir. 1933).  
 144. 485 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). 
 145. Id. at 559. 
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The Seventh Circuit, vacating the orders and remanding, stated: 
It appears that a pattern of practice has developed in the 
Clerk’s office in which summons are not issued 
[automatically without review] when a pro se complaint is 
filed. . . . We do not need to reach the issue of whether the 
practice is constitutional since it is possible to decide the 
appeal on other grounds. The practice here . . . is in clear 
conflict with Rule 4(a) [now 4(b)], Fed.R.Civ.P. which 
imposes a duty on the Clerk to issue the summons 
“forthwith. . . .” We are not unsympathetic with the plight 
of the district courts as they face growing numbers of 
“professional litigants.” We also understand the reluctance 
of its judges to have their courts used as a tool for 
harassment of public officials and others. But . . . it is not 
for a United States district court to resolve the problem by 
cutting off pro se litigation at the wellspring.
146
 
While the Seventh Circuit may have had a good point about a local 
rule that singled out pro se cases for special review, the rest of its 
opinion is shallow and one-sided. The opinion only considers the 
“right” of the plaintiff under the language of Rule 4 to have a summons 
issued “forthwith,” but fails to weigh in the balance the countervailing 
privacy interests of those being sued not to be harassed by being 
required by the state to answer baseless charges. 
As a result of the appellate court decision enforcing the terms of 
Rule 4, Mr. Dear, his lawyer, his new wife, and the state court judge 
who had ruled in his favor in the prior injunction case were required to 
endure eighteen more months of litigation, from September 25, 1973 to 
March 17, 1975, when the district court finally granted summary 
judgment for all defendants.
147
 There is no record of the expense 
involved, but we do know that two law firms and two lawyers from the 
Attorney General’s office all appeared in the case, and that the ex-
husband, Mr. Dear, was eventually forced into default because he 
lacked the financial resources to answer all of his ex-wife’s numerous 
lawsuits.
148
 
In granting summary judgment, the district judge observed that the 
suit against Mr. Dear and his new wife was totally groundless: “This 
action is nothing more than an aftermath of a domestic controversy 
between plaintiff and her former husband. Plaintiff made Mr. Dear’s 
new wife a defendant but made no allegations against her, merely 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 560. 
 147. Dear v. Rathje, 391 F. Supp. 1, 3, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
 148. Id. at 9. 
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charging that she was a conspirator.”149 Almost equally groundless was 
the claim that the attorney had acted under color of state law in 
representing Mr. Dear, or that the state court judge lacked judicial 
immunity for rulings made in the ordinary course of business, even if 
erroneous.
150
 
All told, this totally groundless lawsuit by a vindictive ex-wife 
lasted over three and a half years—from August 14, 1972, when the 
original complaint was filed, until March 16, 1976, when the court of 
appeals finally summarily affirmed the summary judgment.
151
 (Note the 
irony in the word “summary”—“performed speedily”152—to describe a 
unnecessary three and one-half year ordeal that would not have 
occurred prior to the “reforms” of 1938.) 
And this case was merely one of a long “series” that she filed 
against her ex-husband and anyone unlucky enough to be associated 
with him. But under the rigid command of Rule 4, the Seventh Circuit 
held that a federal court was now powerless to prevent its processes 
from being used as an instrument of abuse by a woman scorned. 
Neither Mitchell, Clark, Dobie, nor any of the others involved in 
drafting the 1938 Rules gave indication of any awareness that they had 
fundamentally altered the incentive structure of civil litigation, with far-
reaching consequences of constitutional dimension. None of the drafters 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seems to have paid any attention 
to the economic incentives for the law business that their work was 
creating. One Cassandra who saw clearly the potential for the new 
Rules to increase strike suits was Francis M. Finch, an Associate Justice 
of the New York Court of Appeals. Justice Finch objected at the 1936 
ABA annual meeting that the new Rules would greatly increase the 
potential for strike suits, but his perceptive remarks were dismissed as 
relevant only to “admittedly bad” conditions in New York City where 
many lawyers were considered to have “low ethical standards” but not 
to other parts of the country where lawyers were deemed more ethical 
and less susceptible to succumb to economic incentives.
153
 Unlike 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Id. at 9–10. 
 150. Id. at 8. 
 151. Dear v. Rathje, 532 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1976) (referencing the date the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment); Dear v. Rathje, 485 F.2d 558, 559 (referencing the date the 
complaint was filed).  
 152. Summary, FREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/summary (last 
visited May 10, 2012). 
 153.  
At the same meeting [1936 annual meeting of the ABA] Judge Finch of the 
Court of Appeals of the State of New York made an address deploring the 
extent to which strike suits and dishonest or blackmailing cases are instituted, 
and he suggested that the proposed rules would open the way still further for 
this sort of abuse. His illustrations were taken from conditions in the City of 
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Justice Finch, the drafters seem to have been totally unaware of the 
“increment of the settlement value” that they were creating in Rule 4 by 
giving “a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim” the right “to take up 
the time of a number of other people.”154  
Sixty years after Rule 4 was adopted, in the 1998 recodification of 
the United States Code, portions of the 1792 Process Act passed by the 
First and Second Congresses relating to court control over issuance of 
writs of summons were quietly deleted from Title 28 of the U.S. Code 
on the grounds that they had been “superseded” by the adoption of Rule 
4(b) in 1938.
155
 However, the 1998 codification of Title 28 has never 
been enacted as positive law so the 1792 Process Act is technically still 
on the books, despite its omission from the U.S. Code.
156
 The small 
portion of the original 1792 law about testing of process by the judge 
before issuance that is still included in Title 28 today
157
 is a pale shadow 
of the original passed by the first two Congresses. Today the 
requirement for teste of process is formalistic
158
 and performed as a 
ministerial act by the clerk’s office without any judicial involvement or 
                                                                                                                     
New York. His principal suggestion was that the law should punish the plaintiff 
who brings a strike suit by requiring him to pay not merely the ordinary costs, 
but all the expenses of the defendant, including reasonable counsel fees, if the 
defense is successful. The Advisory Committee believes that any substantial 
change in the present basis for taxing costs or disbursements is a matter for the 
Congress and not properly embodied in the proposed rules of practice and 
procedure. It may be that in large metropolitan areas like New York City where 
the conditions are admittedly bad and many dishonest actions are brought in the 
courts, the rules relating to discovery and examination before trial offer 
opportunities to lawyers of low ethical standards. As applied to the country as a 
whole, we think the rules relating to these subjects are in line with modern 
enlightened thought on the subject and will not be subjected to abuse. Uniform 
rules of practice and procedure must be drawn to meet conditions generally 
throughout the country and not special conditions in a few areas. Our 
suggestion is that in places like New York City the remedy is an improvement 
in the machinery for disbarring or disciplining lawyers guilty of misconduct.  
William D. Mitchell, Outline of Address on Proposed Federal Rules Civil Procedure Before the 
Judicial Section of the American Bar Association (Sept. 1937), supra note 119. 
 154. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 155. 28 U.S.C. § 1691 hist. n. (2006) (“Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 721 . . . . 
Provisions as to teste of process issuing from the district courts were omitted as superseded by 
Rule 4 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (emphasis added)). 
 156. See Richard J. McKinney, United States Code: List of Positive Law Titles with 
Enacting Cites and Location to Revision Notes (Rev to Jan. 2011), http://www.llsdc.org/ 
attachments/wysiwyg/544/usc-pos-law-titles.pdf (noting that the 1948 version of Title 28 but 
not the 1998 codification was enacted as positive law). 
 157. 28 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006). 
 158. Id. (“Seal and teste of process. All writs and process issuing from a court of the United 
States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof.”). 
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discretion; instead, the operative rule that the clerk “must” issue a 
summons at the behest of a private party is provided by Rule 4(b) rather 
than the original statutes passed by the first two Congresses. 
Whether the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the 
Supreme Court was actually effective to “repeal” the provisions of the 
1792 statute requiring test of process by the judge before issuance 
depends upon whether its provisions are deemed to have provided 
persons sued with “a substantive right,” such as a substantive right to be 
free from being required to answer implausible lawsuits. Under the 
Rules Enabling Act, procedural rules may not modify “any substantive 
right” but laws in conflict with the rules are “of no further force or 
effect.”159  
In addition, it might be argued that the 1938 rule was ineffective to 
repeal the 1792 Process Act because it did not go through the 
constitutional procedures for amending or repealing a statute required 
by INS v. Chadha,
160
 the legislative veto case. Several courts and 
commentators have noted the apparent inconsistency between the Rules 
Enabling Act provisions for invalidating inconsistent statutes and 
Chadha. In 1988, when the Rules Enabling Act was last reauthorized by 
Congress, the House questioned including the provision about 
superseding inconsistent statutes on the grounds that it violated 
Chadha’s requirements for bicameral passage and presentation to the 
President for a possible veto.
161
 The Senate did not concur, however, 
and the provision was restored.
162
 Subsequently, a unanimous panel of 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted but did not reach the issue, 
stating as an alternative rationale for its statutory construction that the 
Rules Enabling Act’s provision for superseding statutes “approaches a 
violation” of Chadha and “would strain the Constitution’s limits on the 
exercise of the legislative power.”163 The issue has never been squarely 
                                                                                                                     
 159. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after 
such rules have taken effect.”). 
 160. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 161. H.R. REP. No. 889, at 28 (1988). 
 162. See generally Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1655, 1663 (1995). 
 163. Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 135 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (Garza, J.) (“Another good 
reason not to read the abrogation clause to nullify provisions of the PLRA is that such a reading 
approaches a violation of the Presentment Clause and the nondelegation doctrine. The 
abrogation clause of the Rules Enabling Act purports to give the Supreme Court the legislative 
power to repeal any federal law governing practice and procedure in the courts. Under the Rules 
Enabling Act, the Court need only report such changes to Congress in the form of a rule, which 
would acquire the force of law without Congress ever casting a single vote. To say the least, 
such a power would strain the Constitution’s limits on the exercise of the legislative power. U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 950–51, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L. Ed. 
2d 317 (1983); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529, 55 S. Ct. 
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decided by the Supreme Court. It was noted in passing, however, in 
Clinton v. City of New York,
164
 the line item veto case. There the federal 
government argued unsuccessfully that the line item veto should be 
constitutional by analogy to the Rules Enabling Act, but the Supreme 
Court distinguished the two situations, albeit not persuasively.
165
  
The Supreme Court might not apply the principles of Chadha full-
force to the repeal of statutes by procedural rules because of the Court’s 
own role in promulgating rules of procedure for the lower federal 
courts. A full exploration of that interesting issue would require an 
article at least as long as this one. But for present purposes it is enough 
to indicate that the issues raised by this Article could be raised in 
litigation as well as through the rules amendment process. A person 
summoned to appear in court pursuant to Rule 4 by a summons that had 
not been tested pre-service for plausibility by a judge or magistrate 
judge could argue that the 1792 Process Act requiring all writs 
including the writ of summons to bear the “test” of a judge remains in 
effect, both because it created a “substantive right” not to be required to 
come to court to answer claims that are implausible under Twombly, but 
also because the purported nullification of this portion of the 1792 
Process Act by Rule 4 did not go through the constitutional process 
required by Chadha for amending or repealing a statute. 
In the next three sections, this Article argues that this change, even 
if superficially legal under the Rules Enabling Act as a procedural rather 
than substantive change, was unconstitutional as well as unwise. 
                                                                                                                     
837, 843, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935); see also Note, supra, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 836–37. To avoid 
such a drastic result, we will not construe the abrogation clause to dictate that Rule 24(a) 
invalidates Congress’s subsequent amendments of i.f.p. procedure.”). 
 164. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 165. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 446 n.40 (“The Government argues that the 
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), permits this Court to ‘repeal’ prior laws without 
violating Article I, § 7. Section 2072(b) provides that this Court may promulgate rules of 
procedure for the lower federal courts and that ‘[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of 
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.’ See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 
U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (stating that the procedural rules that this Court promulgates, ‘if they are 
within the authority granted by Congress, repeal’ a prior inconsistent procedural statute); see 
also Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 664 (1996) (citing § 2072(b)). In enacting 
§ 2072(b), however, Congress expressly provided that laws inconsistent with the procedural 
rules promulgated by this Court would automatically be repealed upon the enactment of new 
rules in order to create a uniform system of rules for Article III courts. As in the tariff statutes, 
Congress itself made the decision to repeal prior rules upon the occurrence of a particular 
event—here, the promulgation of procedural rules by this Court.”). A similar argument that 
“Congress itself made the decision to repeal prior [administrative decisions] upon the 
occurrence of a particular event” was made unsuccessfully in Chadha. See E. Donald Elliott, 
INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution and the Legislative Veto, 1983 
SUP. CT. REV. 125, 135–37 (1984). 
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B.  Rule 4(b) Unconstitutionally Seizes Persons and Property 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”166 This 
is an important protection for the most fundamental of all rights: the 
right of privacy, the right to be left alone without intrusion by the 
government except when reasonably justified.  A summons issued under 
Rule(4) is an unreasonable seizure of the person of the alleged debtor 
because the government makes no attempt to verify that there is a 
reasonable basis in law and fact for the suit before ordering the person 
sued in the name of the United States to come to court. 
It is a basic requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment that, 
absent exigent circumstances, the government must obtain a search 
warrant from a neutral judicial officer who independently verifies that 
there is a substantial basis to proceed with a governmental intrusion.
167
 
Presently, however, there is no parallel requirement for independent 
judicial verification of the minimal bona fides of a civil claim before 
someone’s time and money are “seized” through a summons to appear 
and defend in a civil case in federal court. 
The Fourth Amendment applies to civil as well as criminal cases.
168
 
For much the same reasons that we require a showing of either probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion in criminal cases, we should require 
verification that there is a reasonable and credible basis for the 
government to impose the substantial cost and inconvenience of being 
                                                                                                                     
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 167. A possible, albeit adventurous, argument might be advanced that a summons under 
Rule 4(b) to appear and defend should be considered a “warrant” for purposes of the additional 
protections of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. A strong argument has been made 
on historical grounds that the higher standard requiring an advance judicial determination of 
probable cause (as opposed to mere reasonableness) was imposed under the Warrant Clause 
because officers acting under the protection of a warrant were not responsible for their actions at 
common law. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of 
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 60 (1996); see also William J. Stuntz, Warrant Clause, 
in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 326 (2005) (“When the Fourth Amendment was 
written, the sole remedy for an illegal search or seizure was a lawsuit for money damages. 
Government officials used warrants as a defense against such lawsuits.”). As a practical matter, 
the well-known judicial reluctance to award full  retroactively costs in even the most abusive 
situations means that someone obtaining a civil summons under Rule 4(b) is, as a practical 
matter, immune from ever having to answer in damages for the costs that they impose on others, 
much like an officer serving a search warrant at common law. 
 168. For an early article observing that the Fourth Amendment applies to civil as well as 
criminal cases, see Louis J. DeReuil, Applicability of the Fourth Amendment in Civil Cases, 
1963 DUKE L. J. 472 (1963). Unfortunately, however, Louis J. DeReuil, who was serving at the 
time as an Internal Revenue Service attorney, largely limited his observations to summons in tax 
cases, but he clearly maintains that the Fourth Amendment applies to orders of summons in civil 
cases. Id. at 472, 487. 
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involved in a lawsuit before requiring fellow citizens to come to court 
and answer charges. And yet the government arbitrarily imposes that 
very substantial burden and inconvenience on citizens based on the 
unverified say-so of a single person without any attempt to corroborate 
his claim or verify his credibility. The government could not obtain a 
warrant to search your home, in many ways a much lesser intrusion on 
your privacy than making you a defendant in a lawsuit, based solely on 
the uncorroborated claims of a single informant who had not been 
shown to be credible. Rather, except in exigent circumstances, an 
independent judicial official must verify that the facts provide a 
substantial basis to credit the informant’s story.169 Yet the Federal Rules 
do not impose a similar minimal requirement of reasonableness before 
someone’s time and property are seized by the government via an order 
of summons to appear in a civil case. 
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of this 
aspect of Rule 4,
170
 and there are no appellate cases on point. The case 
that comes closest is Williams v. Chai-Hsu Lu.
171
 In that case, in the 
context of a § 1983 damage action against state process servers, the 
Eighth Circuit announced the ipse dixit that “[a] court’s mere 
acquisition of jurisdiction over a person in a civil case by service of 
process is not a seizure under the fourth amendment.”172 But that 
pronouncement was not accompanied by any analysis, nor was the 
argument made or ruled upon that the state has an obligation to conduct 
a preliminary inquiry into the bona fides of a civil claim before 
summoning a person sued to answer. Moreover, to the extent that the 
court offers any analysis at all, it is one-sided and invalid. The issue is 
not that the “mere acquisition of jurisdiction over a person” in a 
metaphysical sense constitutes an unreasonable seizure; the New York 
practice of giving private notice that suit is about to be brought is part of 
a state-sanctioned process for acquiring jurisdiction over a person, but it 
does not involve a governmental order to appear. On the contrary, one is 
free if he or she so chooses to ignore the notice and rely on whether the 
plaintiff can prove a sufficient prima facie case to obtain a default 
judgment. Under the state practice, one is not ordered by the 
government to appear and defend; rather, they are merely given notice 
of the right to do so. 
                                                                                                                     
 169. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (holding that magistrate may rely on 
policeman’s knowledge of a suspect’s reputation for credibility when assessing the reliability of 
an informant’s tip). 
 170. The Supreme Court last considered Rule 4 in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 
(1965) (interpreting the Erie doctrine to allow Rule 4 to govern service of process even when 
this would lead to a different outcome than the state rule). 
 171. 335 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 172. Id. at 808–09. 
46
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/3
2012] TWOMBLY IN CONTEXT 941 
 
The constitutional “seizure” results from the federal government’s 
additional actions in imposing an official order to come to court and to 
expend resources (either in time or money, and usually both) to 
answer—upon pain of substantial official financial sanctions—without 
any attempt to verify that there is a reasonable basis for doing so. An 
official document signed and sealed by the court tells you that you 
“must” answer and that if you fail to do so, default judgment “will” be 
entered for the amount sought in the complaint. That is not a polite 
invitation, nor merely a notice of actions being taken against you by 
another private party. Rather, it is an unmistakable command from the 
state, backed by a threat of official sanctions if you disobey.
173
  
Lower court cases such as Williams v. Chai-Hsu Lu, holding that a 
civil summons is not a “seizure” in the constitutional sense, also ignore 
the established body of Fourth Amendment law defining “seizures.” 
The conventional legal test for whether a Fourth Amendment “seizure” 
has occurred is whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable 
person would conclude that someone has been deprived of his freedom 
by the state, or alternatively is free to go on about his business as he 
chooses.
174
 For example, a roadblock designed to halt a car chase has 
been held to constitute a “seizure,” even though the fleeing suspect was 
not physically placed under arrest.
175
 It is the state’s intentional 
restriction of a person’s freedom of movement, and not the particular 
means chosen by the state to accomplish the restriction, that defines a 
“seizure” in the constitutional sense.176 As Justice Antonin Scalia 
explained for a unanimous Supreme Court, a command by an officer of 
the state that is intended to restrict someone’s freedom of movement 
with which they comply is a “seizure” in the constitutional sense: 
It is clear, in other words, that a Fourth Amendment seizure 
does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused 
termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the 
innocent passerby), nor even whenever there is a 
governmentally caused and governmentally desired 
termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the 
                                                                                                                     
 173. LARRY L. TEPLY, RALPH U. WHITTEN & DENIS F. MCLAUGHLIN, CASES, TEXT, AND 
PROBLEMS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 32 (2d ed., 2002) (“A summons is a paper that notifies the 
defendant that the actions has been commenced. It also commands the defendant to appear and 
defend the action by a certain date or the court will enter a judgment (a default judgment) 
against the defendant for the remedy demanded by the plaintiff.” (emphasis added)). 
 174. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.”). 
 175. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989). 
 176. Id. at 596–97. 
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fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental 
termination of freedom of movement through means 
intentionally applied. . . . This analysis is reflected by our 
decision in Hester v. United States, where an armed 
revenue agent had pursued the defendant and his 
accomplice after seeing them obtain containers thought to 
be filled with “moonshine whisky.” During their flight they 
dropped the containers, which the agent recovered. The 
defendant sought to suppress testimony concerning the 
containers’ contents as the product of an unlawful seizure. 
Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, 
concluded: “The defendant’s own acts, and those of his 
associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and the bottle—and 
there was no seizure in the sense of the law when the 
officers examined the contents of each after they had been 
abandoned.” Thus, even though the incriminating 
containers were unquestionably taken into possession as a 
result (in the broad sense) of action by the police, the Court 
held that no seizure had taken place. It would have been 
quite different, of course, if the revenue agent had shouted, 
“Stop and give us those bottles, in the name of the law!” 
and the defendant and his accomplice had complied. Then 
the taking of possession would have been not merely the 
result of government action but the result of the very means 
(the show of authority) that the government selected, and a 
Fourth Amendment seizure would have occurred.
177
 
The official summons in a civil case is the direct written equivalent 
of the Supreme Court’s hypothetical revenue agent shouting, “Stop and 
give us those bottles in the name of the law,” which the Supreme Court 
specifically and unanimously stated is “a Fourth Amendment 
seizure.”178 The subsequent cases also stand for the proposition that a 
command by the authorities is enough to constitute a “seizure” in the 
constitutional sense if it is followed by compliance even though no 
physical force is used.
179
 “An arrest requires either physical 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Id. at 596–98 (third emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 178. Id. at 597. 
 179. United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that when the 
police yelled “stop” and the defendant obeyed, the defendant was seized); United States v. 
Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 1066–67 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that the individual was seized when 
he got out of the truck after a command from an officer within a patrol car); United States v. 
Jones, 562 F.3d 768, 775 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that defendant was seized when he “complied 
with [the officer’s] order to stop”); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 262 (2007) 
(“[A] fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may 
submit to authority by not getting up to run away.”). 
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force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of 
authority.”180 
The summons in a civil case certainly meets these criteria for 
“submission to the assertion of [official] authority.” 
Well into the sixteenth century, . . . the writ of capias ad 
respondenum . . . directed the sheriff to arrest defendants and 
bring them before the court. Today service of process substitutes 
for bodily seizure, but behind that innocent-looking piece of 
paper titled “Summons” stands the full coercive power of the 
State.
181
  
No reasonable person reading the standard form summons 
reproduced above could conclude that the person receiving it was free to 
go on about his business. The official-looking form bearing an official 
seal explicitly informs the recipient that untoward legal consequences 
will be visited upon him or her by the state if he or she does not do 
exactly as commanded—”judgment by default will be entered against 
you for the relief demanded in the complaint,”182 which is generally a 
tidy sum designated by the person suing, again without any review for 
reasonableness by the state. For example, in one case that made the 
headlines, a former D.C. administrative law judge sued his local 
cleaners for $67 million for allegedly losing his pants.
183
 It is 
indefensible for the state to issue an official threat to one of its citizens 
that it will impose $67 million in financial penalties if he or she fails to 
show up in court to answer a lawsuit over a lost pair of pants without 
any attempt to confirm that the sanctions threatened are reasonably 
proportional to the issues.
184
 
The most thoughtful exploration
185
 in modern jurisprudence of 
whether a summons constitutes a constitutionally-protected “seizure” 
under the Fourth Amendment is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
                                                                                                                     
 180. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 
 181. BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 25, at 104. 
 182. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 3 app. at 100. 
 183. Pearson v. Chung, 961 A.2d 1067, 1069–70 (D.C. 2008). 
 184. By contrast, the magistrate courts of the Republic of South Africa specifically 
authorize the clerk to decline to issue a summons if an excessive amount is claimed for 
attorney’s costs or court fees. TORQUIL M. PATERSON, ECKARD’S PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN THE MAGISTRATE’S COURTS 94 (5th ed., 2005). 
 185. Admittedly, there are lower court cases that come out the other way, but most of them 
merely announce the result that being required to come to court, without more, is not a 
constitutional “seizure” without the type of deeper historical and functional analysis made by 
Justice Ginsburg. See, e.g., Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Absent any 
evidence that [plaintiff] was arrested, detained, restricted in his travel, or otherwise subject to a 
deprivation of his liberty before the charges against him were dismissed, the fact that he was 
given a date to appear in court is insufficient to establish a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
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concurring opinion in Albright v. Oliver.
186
 In that case, after an 
extensive review of the common law precedents and history, Justice 
Ginsburg squarely concluded that a person “is equally bound to appear, 
and is hence ‘seized’ for trial, when the state employs the less strong-
arm means of a summons in lieu of arrest.”187 That case happened to 
involve a summons in a criminal case, but there is no reason why a 
summons to appear in a civil case would be any less a “seizure” in the 
constitutional sense than a summons to appear in a criminal case. 
It should be noted, however, that Rules 4(a) and 9(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, unlike their civil counterpart, have long 
required a preliminary determination of reasonableness before the state 
issues a summons requiring someone to appear and defend against 
criminal charges even though no physical arrest is involved.
188
 
Similarly, no adverse consequences can be visited upon an individual 
for ignoring an IRS summons until a court determines that it is 
reasonable and enforces it.
189
 And the courts will not enforce an 
administrative subpoena unless it is determined by a neutral magistrate 
that it is reasonable to require a response.
190
 In some circumstances, it 
has even been held that reasonableness requires the requester to pay the 
costs of compliance.
191
 But there is no parallel requirement that the 
courts assess the reasonableness of a civil claim before they compel the 
person sued to report to court to respond. Nor is there presently a 
requirement or practice to make someone whole after the fact, even if 
the claim is speculative or turns out to be implausible under Twombly. 
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not only 
unreasonably “seizes” the person of the defendant by requiring him or 
                                                                                                                     
 186. 510 U.S. 266, 276 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 187. Id. at 279. 
 188. United States v. Gobey, 12 F.3d 964, 967 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Under the federal rules 
[of criminal procedure] . . . a summons cannot be issued in the first instance without probable 
cause, the decision of a neutral magistrate, and the requisite particularity.”); accord United 
States. v. Greenberg, 320 F.2d 467, 472 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Hondras, 176 F. Supp. 
2d 855, 858 (E.D. Wis. 2001). “The language of Rule 9(a) indicates that a issuance of a 
summons also requires probable cause when it says that at the request of the government, the 
court must issue a summons ‘if one or more affidavits accompanying the information establish 
probable cause.’” 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 51, at n.4 (4th ed. 2008). 
 189. Schulz v. IRS, 395 F.3d 463, 465 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A]bsent an effort to seek 
enforcement through a federal court, IRS summonses apply no force to taxpayers, and no 
consequence whatever can befall a taxpayer who refuses, ignores, or otherwise does not comply 
with an IRS summons until that summons is backed by a federal court order.”).  
 190. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 653–54 (1950) (explaining that a 
court will enforce an administrative subpoena but only if reasonable). 
 191. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1071 (1979) (“[T]he power to exact reimbursement as the price of enforcement is soundly 
exercised only when the financial burden of compliance exceeds that which the party ought 
reasonably be made to shoulder.”). 
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her to come to court to defend, either personally or through an attorney, 
without any prior determination by the state that is reasonable to compel 
him or her to do so, but it also at least arguably “seizes” the defendant’s 
property
192
 by requiring him or her to expend defense costs without any 
prior attempt by the state to determine that the financial imposition is 
justified. However, the deprivation of property is probably more 
properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause, as discussed in the 
next Section. 
C.  Rule 4(b) Unconstitutionally Deprives Persons Sued of Property 
Without Due Process of Law 
The Fifth Amendment provides two separate protections against 
economic impositions by the federal government: the Takings Clause 
and the Deprivations Clause.
193
 The Deprivations Clause (which Rule 4 
violates) is broader than the Takings Clause
 194
 (which Rule 4 generally 
does not violate)
195
 and their purposes are different. The Takings Clause 
applies if, but only if, property is confiscated by the government for 
public use. On the other hand, the Deprivations Clause provides that the 
protections of procedural and substantive due process must apply before 
anyone may be “deprived” of use or control of their property by the 
government, whether or not it is taken for public use by the state. The 
core purpose behind the Deprivations Clause is to ensure that a 
“legitimate governmental purpose” justifies an imposition on citizens 
causing them trouble and expense.
196
 Rule 4 is deficient in that the 
government makes no attempt whatsoever to verify that there is a 
                                                                                                                     
 192. “A ‘seizure’ of property, we have explained, occurs when ‘there is some meaningful 
interference [by the state] with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Soldal v. 
Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 
(1984)). 
 193. “No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 194. See Jennifer B. Arlin, Of Property Rights and the Fifth Amendment: FIRREA’s Cross-
Guarantee Reexamined, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 293, 311 (1991) (“A taking is distinct from a 
deprivation in several ways. First, when the government ‘takes’ property, it takes it for public 
use and is required to pay just compensation. . . .This clause is stricter than the first clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, the Deprivations Clause, because it can apply only to private property being 
taken for public use. The Takings Clause requires no process; its only requirement is that the 
former property owner be reimbursed ‘justly’ for the value of the property.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 195. The narrow exception in which the Takings Clause may also be implicated is the 
special circumstance discussed hereafter in which defendants are required to subsidize 
investigations in the “reasonable but speculative” category of cases discussed infra Part II.D.  
 196. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718–19 (1879) (“The United States cannot any 
more than a State interfere with private rights, except for legitimate governmental purposes. 
They are . . . prohibited from depriving persons or corporations of property without due process 
of law.”). 
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legitimate reason to order someone to answer in court before depriving 
them of property by requiring them to expend resources to answer 
charges in court. 
The key element that triggers the Deprivations Clause is that 
someone is denied possession or use of money or another recognized 
form of property
197
 by the state. Thus, the Fifth Amendment guarantee 
against deprivations of property without due process of law has 
repeatedly been held to apply to situations in which the state imposes 
costs or requires payments to third parties. For example, a unilateral 
EPA order requiring a company to spend money to clean up a 
Superfund site unquestionably constitutes a “deprivation” of property, 
although four circuits have now held that the procedure does not violate 
due process because it is reasonable and provides for a pre-deprivation 
judicial hearing.
198
 Similarly, by requiring someone who is sued to 
expend resources to answer charges in court, the state is clearly 
imposing costs and thereby “depriving” the person sued of property so 
as to trigger due process protections. This is true whether they hire 
counsel, or merely pay for the transportation costs and paper to 
represent themselves pro se (although of course the magnitude is greater 
when counsel is employed). The costs imposed by litigation are not 
trivial. According to the Federal Judicial Center, the average cost of a 
case in 2009 was $15,000,
199
 although, unsurprisingly, the costs varied 
in proportion to a number of variables.
200
 
Deprivations of property are not necessarily illegal; but they must 
comply with due process, which means that they must be substantively 
reasonable and accompanied by procedures appropriate to the 
circumstances. What is unusual about current Rule 4, however, is that 
the government forswears any inquiry into the reasonableness of its 
                                                                                                                     
 197. In addition, although not relevant here, some cases state that “property” is defined 
more broadly for purposes of the Deprivation Clause than for the Takings Clause. Corn v. City 
of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1996) (“‘Property’ as used in the Just 
Compensation Clause is defined much more narrowly than in the due process clauses.”). 
 198. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 113–14, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011) (“The parties agree that the costs of compliance and the monetary fines 
and damages associated with noncompliance qualify as protected property interests.”); see also 
Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2010), rev. on other grounds, Sackett v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.S.C. No. 10-1062 (Mar. 21, 2012); Emp’rs Ins. of 
Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656, 664–65 (7th Cir. 1995); Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 
F.2d 383, 391–92 (8th Cir. 1987); Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 315–17 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
 199. Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html. 
 200. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS 
IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/us 
courts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DukeMaterials/Library/FJC,LitigationCostsinCivilCases-Multiva 
riateAnalysis.pdf. 
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actions before it imposes substantial economic costs on the putative 
defendants. This unthinking imposition of economic costs on the 
persons sued without providing reasonably available procedures such as 
the PSPD that are already used in many similar situations to assess the 
reasonableness of the economic harm imposed by the state violates the 
Deprivations Clause. 
Rule 4 sticks out like a sore thumb because it provides no pre-
deprivation process whatsoever and rarely is a person who is wrongly 
sued reimbursed retroactively for the expenses incurred. Rule 4 also 
arguably offends the equal protection component of the Due Process 
Clause by automatically taking the word of one group of citizens as the 
basis for imposing burdens on another group of citizens.
201
 
What process is “due” is of course dependent upon the 
circumstances.
202
 At the time that the writ of summons developed in the 
thirteenth century, when few people could read or write, much less 
communicate by email and telephone, commanding someone to appear 
before the King personally in order to answer charges may have been 
the most efficient way to determine whether there was a reasonable 
basis for the claims.
203
 But that is no longer the case today, and due 
process requires a system that is tailored to what is reasonably available.  
In a long line of cases beginning in Sniadach v. Family Finance 
Corp. of Bay View,
204
 and extended in Fuentes v. Shevin,
205
 the Supreme 
Court has held that the Due Process Clause constrains the use of other 
long-established common law writs and remedies so that not even a 
temporary deprivation of property by the state is allowed without a prior 
inquiry appropriate to the circumstances.
206
 The 1975 due process 
                                                                                                                     
 201. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (“The federal 
sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially.”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 
(1976) (treating equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area the same as that under 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (same). 
 202. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–18 (1950). 
 203. Andrew H. Hershey, Justice and Bureaucracy: The English Royal Writ and “1258,” 
113 ENG. HIST. REV. 829, 837–38 (1998) (describing difficulties and expense of travel to court 
to complain or answer). At a later date, an alternative procedure called the querela developed in 
which someone could present their claims orally to four knights in a local country court, rather 
than travel to where the King and his Chancery clerks were present. Id. at 844. 
 204. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (holding that a statute permitting prejudgment garnishment 
of wages without notice and prior hearing violates due process). 
 205. 407 U.S. 67, 69–70, 96 (1972) (holding state replevin provisions that permitted 
vendors to have goods seized through an ex parte application to a court clerk and posting of a 
bond violates due process). 
 206. It is well-settled that even preliminary and temporary deprivations of property require 
process appropriate to the circumstances. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due 
Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12 (2006) (“Due process requires hearing procedures with 
respect to temporary or preliminary deprivations, as well as for those that are final and 
permanent.”).  
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decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.
207
 is 
particularly interesting for our purposes. The Court suggested in dicta 
that the combination of a detailed affidavit, a determination of facial 
validity by a neutral magistrate, and a bond to pay costs for property 
wrongfully seized pendente lite could be sufficient to satisfy due 
process.
208
 
The suggestion in Di-Chem that a detailed affidavit, reviewed by a 
neutral judicial officer, and a bond or other procedure to compensate the 
victim for wrongful deprivations, would be sufficient to comply with 
due process is also consistent with the decision in Mitchell v. W.T. 
Grant Co.
209
 That case upheld a Louisiana statute permitting a secured 
creditor with a preexisting lien to sequester property pre-judgment. The 
Mitchell Court emphasized the lienholder’s preexisting interest in 
preventing dissipation of the previously encumbered property, but also 
the requirement for a detailed affidavit from which a judge could 
determine a clear entitlement to the writ, plus the availability of an 
immediate post-deprivation hearing with the option for damages.
210
 
Rule 4, however, provides none of these three constitutionally 
required elements that have been applied to constrain potential abuse of 
other common law writs: a detailed affidavit verifying the claim, a 
neutral judicial evaluation before imposing the burden, and a process for 
compensating the victim if the deprivation turns out to be invalid. And, 
unlike in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., the plaintiff in an ordinary civil 
case has no preexisting lien whatsoever on the defendant’s assets. Nor 
does the theoretical possibility of a suit after the fact for abuse of 
process or malicious prosecution remedy the defect. These suits require 
an additional showing of an improper purpose and malice or subjective 
intent. Merely showing that the suit was objectively unfounded and 
unreasonable is insufficient.
211
 Unlike the temporary deprivations of 
                                                                                                                     
 207. 419 U.S. 601, 606–07 (1975) (invalidating an ex parte garnishment statute that failed 
to provide for notice and prior hearing or to require a bond, a detailed affidavit setting out the 
claim, the determination of a neutral magistrate, or a prompt post-deprivation hearing). 
 208. Id. at 607. 
 209. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
 210. Id. at 604–07. 
 211. A cause of action for abuse of process generally requires proof of an ulterior motive or 
improper purpose. See Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 
223 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The elements of abuse of process are (1) the improper 
use of the court’s process (2) primarily for an ulterior purpose (3) with resulting damage to the 
plaintiff asserting the misuse.” (quoting Bank of Okla., N.A. v. Portis, 942 P.2d 249, 255 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Vittands v. Sudduth, 730 N.E.2d 325, 332 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (“The essential elements of the tort of abuse of process are ‘(1) “process” 
was used; (2) for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose; (3) resulting in damage.’” (quoting Kelley 
v. Stop & Shop Cos., 530 N.E.2d 190, 191 (1988))); see also 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abuse of Process 
§ 6 (2012) (“[U]lterior motive or purpose [is] generally required in an abuse of process 
action.”); id. (“[M]ere ill will or spite toward the adverse party in a proceeding does not 
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property by common law writs found unconstitutional in the Fuentes v. 
Shevin line of cases, the deprivation of property worked by the writ of 
summons is almost always permanent and irreparable because under the 
so-called American Rule, costs are not assessed against losing parties in 
litigation. As a result, the state has a particularly strong obligation to 
provide pre-deprivation procedures. 
This line of due process cases from the 1970s was reiterated and 
clarified in 1991 in Connecticut v. Doehr,
212
 in which a unanimous 
Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut statute authorizing pre-
judgment attachment of real estate as security for a pending civil suit 
based on an ex parte judicial determination of probable cause. The 
Connecticut pre-judgment attachment procedure imposed a much lesser 
burden than Rule 4 in that pre-judgment attachment typically imposed 
no actual financial costs on the defendant. Instead, it merely consisted 
of entering a lis pendens on the land records, thereby notifying other 
creditors of the pending unrelated claim and establishing the priority of 
the potential judgment creditor in the case under suit.
213
 Nonetheless, a 
unanimous Supreme Court declared this procedure unconstitutional 
because, without prior notice and hearing, or exigent circumstances and 
a requirement to post a bond to make the owner whole afterwards, the 
state deprived someone of private property without due process.
214
 
                                                                                                                     
constitute an ulterior or improper motive, where the process is used only for the purpose for 
which it was designed and intended.”). In addition, in most jurisdictions, a suit for malicious 
prosecution requires not only an improper purpose, but also subjective knowledge by the person 
filing suit that there were no reasonable grounds for suing. See 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious 
Prosecution § 1 (2012) (“A malicious prosecution may be briefly defined as one that is begun in 
malice and without probable cause to believe it can succeed, and that finally ends in failure.”). 
Merely filing a lawsuit that the state would have determined on preliminary review to be 
insufficiently well-founded to require the person sued to answer would not necessarily be 
actionable either as an abuse of process or as a malicious prosecution. See Campbell v. City of 
San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 980–81 (5th Cir. 1995) (pointing out that malicious prosecution 
claims require a showing of malice, ill will, or improper purpose). Nor do prevailing rules and 
practices for assessing costs require the person suing to reimburse those who were sued for their 
costs merely because the claims under suit turn out to be unfounded. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, 10 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2668 (3d ed. 2010). 
 212. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).  
 213. Id. at 11–12 (“We agree with the Court of Appeals that the property interests that 
attachment affects are significant. For a property owner like Doehr, attachment ordinarily clouds 
title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating; 
reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even place 
an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause. . . . [T]he State 
correctly points out that these effects do not amount to a complete, physical, or permanent 
deprivation of real property . . . .”); see also id. at 27 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (“In the present case, on the other hand, [unlike prior precedents] Connecticut’s 
prejudgment attachment on real property statute, which secures an incipient lien for the plaintiff, 
does not deprive the defendant of the use or possession of the property.”). 
 214. Id. at 18 (majority opinion). 
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For our purposes it is particularly relevant that in Doehr, 
Connecticut tried unsuccessfully to defend its statute by analogy to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that “that the statute requires 
something akin to the plaintiff stating a claim with sufficient facts to 
survive a motion to dismiss.”215 The Supreme Court unanimously 
rejected Connecticut’s argument that the plaintiff’s unverified say-so in 
enough detail to survive a motion to dismiss was sufficient to justify 
even the temporary deprivation of control of real property resulting 
from a pre-judgment attachment. The Doehr Court applied the modern 
due process framework that had developed since Sniadach and its 
progeny for balancing competing private and public interests against the 
risk of error under Mathews v. Eldridge.
216
 The Doehr Court explained: 
[T]he statute presents too great a risk of erroneous 
deprivation under any of these interpretations. . . . Permitting 
a court to authorize attachment merely because the plaintiff 
believes the defendant is liable, or because the plaintiff can 
make out a facially valid complaint, would permit the 
deprivation of the defendant’s property when the claim 
would fail to convince a jury, when it rested on factual 
allegations that were sufficient to state a cause of action 
but which the defendant would dispute . . . . The potential 
for unwarranted attachment in these situations is self-
evident and too great to satisfy the requirements of due 
process absent any countervailing consideration. . . . It is 
self-evident that the judge could make no realistic 
assessment concerning the likelihood of an action’s success 
based upon these one-sided, self-serving, and conclusory 
submissions.
217
 
Applying this same analysis to the much more substantial 
deprivation of property worked by Rule 4—the costs of defense 
imposed on every person sued, “merely because the plaintiff believes 
the defendant is liable”—should lead to exactly the same result. 
Moreover, Doehr stands for the proposition that more is required than 
“one-sided, self-serving, and conclusory submissions,” such as those in 
a typical complaint. 
Significantly, this line of due process cases was decided a 
generation after Rule 4 was written, yet it appears that the provisions of 
Rule 4 have never been seriously reconsidered in light of them. It is not 
apparent why a requirement to spend money to answer charges in a civil 
case based on the unverified say-so of a would-be creditor should be 
                                                                                                                     
 215. Id. at 13. 
 216. 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 217. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 13–14 (emphasis added).  
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any different than the pre-judgment attachment of real property based 
on the unverified say-so of a would-be creditor that was struck down as 
unconstitutional in Doehr. Connecticut’s pre-judgment attachment 
statute contained substantially more protection against arbitrariness
218
 
than is currently provided by Rule 4. 
It is also interesting that four Justices in Doehr went on to opine that 
when exigent circumstances do not permit a hearing, a bond to 
reimburse a person wrongfully deprived of his property might be 
constitutionally required.
219
 This strongly suggests that so-called “cost 
shifting”220 may be constitutionally required in situations where courts 
allow plaintiffs to conduct “fishing expedition” discovery to determine 
whether they have a valid cause of action, but the plaintiff is 
unsuccessful in doing so.
221
 The other five Justices did not disagree; 
they simply felt that it was unnecessary to address that issue in the case 
before them. 
For the same reason that the Supreme Court has held that other 
common law writs and remedies such as replevin and garnishment must 
be disciplined by the Due Process Clause, so too the writ of summons 
should be issued only after the state verifies that a deprivation of the 
proposed defendant’s property is justified by the plausibility of the 
plaintiff’s claims.  
D.  Rule 4(b) Unconstitutionally Delegates Governmental Power to 
Private Parties 
The decision to order someone to come to court to answer charges is 
undeniably an exercise of state power, as pointed out by attorney Philip 
K. Howard.
222
 Rule 4, however, makes the issuance of a federal civil 
                                                                                                                     
 218. Id. at 14–15 (“Connecticut points out that the statute also [in addition to an ex parte 
judicial determination of probable cause] provides an ‘expeditiou[s]’ postattachment adversary 
hearing; notice for such a hearing; judicial review of an adverse decision; and a double damages 
action if the original suit is commenced without probable cause.” (citations and footnotes 
omitted)). 
 219. Id. at 18–23 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Stevens, & O’Connor, JJ.). 
 220. That term should be grating to anyone graduating from any law school that teaches 
law and economics after about 1980, as Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase showed 
in a famous article long ago that costs do not naturally “belong” to either plaintiffs or 
defendants. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960). 
 221. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost 
Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 775 (2011), and infra 
text at notes 228–42 (discussing “reasonable but speculative” cases and arguing that the 
plaintiffs attorney should routinely pay for discovery in such cases). 
 222. See Howard, supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Doehr, 501 U.S. at 9 
(stating question as “what process must be afforded by a state statute enabling an individual to 
enlist the aid of the State to deprive another of his or her property by means of the prejudgment 
attachment or similar procedure”). 
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summons a ministerial act by the court clerk.
223
 It thereby delegates an 
important exercise of state power to private individuals in violation of 
the constitutional provision that judicial power is vested in the courts. 
Worse yet, there are no standards that private individuals must satisfy in 
order to exercise this fundamental attribute of state power (beyond 
properly filling out the form of summons, which is a patently 
insufficient check on this delegation of state power). This violates the 
fundamental constitutional principle that government power may not be 
delegated to private individuals without appropriate standards to guide 
its exercise.
224
 Far less serious exercises of governmental power than 
issuing a court order to participate in a lawsuit have been held to violate 
the principle against delegating government power to private 
individuals. For example, statutes that require the consent of adjoining 
property owners to a change in zoning classification have been held 
unconstitutional because they delegate governmental powers to private 
individuals.
225
 
The issue of standardless delegation of governmental power to 
private individuals is particularly objectionable because the private 
actors
226
 exercising this state power, plaintiffs’ lawyers, have a financial 
stake in the outcome. If a judge made these same decisions about whom 
to order to court, but had a financial interest in nuisance settlements to 
avoid litigation costs, we would instantly recognize a violation of due 
process.
227
 But we allow plaintiffs’ lawyers, with contingent fee 
arrangements who will share in the proceeds of any nuisance settlement, 
to require court orders to be issued to any person they choose without 
any control by the court to insure that the order to appear and defend 
has a reasonable basis in law and in fact. 
                                                                                                                     
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 72–77. 
 224. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936) (noting that Fifth Amendment 
due process limits the authority of the federal government to delegate to other coal producers the 
power to fix wages and hours); see also George Bush, Statement on Signing the Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act of 1990 (Nov. 29, 1990), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index 
.php?pid=19115 (last visited May 2, 2012).  
 225. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 120–23 (1928) (holding a zoning 
variance only by consent of adjacent owners to be unconstitutional); Eubank v. City of 
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 140, 142, 144 (1912) (holding the setting of property lines by adjacent 
owners to be unconstitutional). 
 226. Even if lawyers admitted to practice before a court are considered “officers of the 
court,” they still have a financial interest in the decisions that they make. And note also that the 
power to require the clerk to issue a court order of summons is not limited to officers of the 
court, but may be exercised by any person, whether or not admitted to practice before the court. 
 227. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 535 (1927) (stating that due process is violated if a 
judge has a personal, direct, and substantial financial interest in the outcome); see also Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (finding that due process was violated when a 
judge, who received large campaign contributions from a litigant, refused to recuse himself in 
that litigant’s case). 
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This problem of delegating state power to those with a financial 
interest in the outcome is particularly serious when plaintiffs’ lawyers 
are empowered by the state to bring cases that do not currently have a 
reasonable basis in law or in fact. The Rules properly allow plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to bring such cases in the hope that they will later be able to 
develop a reasonable basis for the claim either through facts unearthed 
in discovery,
228
 or “by a non-frivolous argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”229 
Some of these speculative cases are reasonable in terms of the benefits 
they confer on society and probably should be allowed.
230
  
It does not follow automatically, however, that the person sued 
should subsidize the investigation into whether a wrong has been 
committed.
231
 In such “reasonable but speculative” cases, it should be 
routine for the plaintiff’s lawyer to pay the costs that his or her 
speculation in “litigation futures” imposes on the persons sued.232 
Normally in a market economy those who make the decision to invest in 
an economic opportunity are required to pay the costs of the social 
resources consumed by their endeavor. This is thought to create a self-
policing system in which those who are in the best position to determine 
whether an opportunity is worth pursuing can balance both the costs and 
benefits of the activity in which they choose to engage. The litigation 
business is unusual, however, in that a plaintiff’s lawyer may 
externalize a substantial portion of the costs of the economic venture 
that he or she initiates onto the defendant, but the attorney and his client 
obtain all of the benefits if the venture is successful. In other contexts, 
this incentive structure, in which one economic actor gets the profits but 
                                                                                                                     
 228. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring an attorney or unrepresented party to represent to 
the court that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, 
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery”). 
 229. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
 230. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 932–35 (2009). 
 231. See Orr v. Turco Mfg. Co., Inc., 512 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ind. 1987) (Shepard, C.J., 
concurring). 
 232. Cf. Redish & McNamara, supra note 221, at 777 (“We therefore liken the discovery 
process to a quasi contract, and argu[ing] that it is morally untenable to allow the requesting 
party to retain the benefit of its opponent’s labor without, at the very least, reimbursing the costs 
of discovery incurred by the producing party.”); id. (reinforcing that the party bringing suit 
should be accountable for the initial costs of inquiry required to prove the suit is founded on a 
meritorious claim).  Of course, like every rule, there may be exceptions, and these could be 
accommodated through a waiver of the “requester pays” default principle when necessary in the 
public interest. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (authorizing waivers of fees under the Freedom 
of Information Act if “disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely 
to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the 
government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester”). 
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another bears the risks, has been criticized by economists for creating 
runaway speculation.
233
 
The present system, however, unconstitutionally delegates all of 
these decisions to the plaintiff’s lawyer without any standards, 
supervision, or review by the state subject only to the toothless threat of 
sanctions under Rule 11 if the case turns out to be unreasonable. This is 
another, more subtle version of the problem of standardless delegations 
of government power to private individuals discussed above. The policy 
judgment that plaintiffs should sometimes be allowed to bring cases that 
are not well-founded in existing law or in the facts currently in the 
plaintiff’s possession does not mean that decision should be delegated 
to private individuals who have a financial interest in the outcome.
234
 
But because this fundamentally judicial decision to allow a case to go 
forward despite the absence of sufficient law or evidence to support it 
has been delegated to private parties to be made sub silentio, the federal 
system currently seems to have no problem with allowing plaintiffs’ 
lawyers with a personal financial stake in the outcome routinely to 
summon and impose costs on defendants against whom they currently 
lack sufficient evidence, thereby creating settlement value that inures to 
the personal benefit of the plaintiffs’ lawyer.235 Because this occurs “out 
of sight, out of mind,” judges have no idea how common it is for 
defendants to be extorted using power delegated by the state into 
making payments in cases in which they are not legitimately 
involved.
236
 
The best that can be said for these “something may turn up” or 
“fishing expedition” cases is that they may be filed in good faith, but 
speculatively, by private parties with a financial stake in the outcome. A 
more sinister explanation is that experienced plaintiffs’ lawyers know 
from experience that many of the people they are suing will pay 
nuisance value. They should not be condemned for responding 
rationally to the lucrative economic opportunities that the ethical and 
                                                                                                                     
 233. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of 
Bankruptcy for Profit, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 2 (1993). 
 234. Cf. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 803–09 (1987). 
Even legal representatives may fall under this category. For example, counsel for a party that is 
the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed to undertake criminal contempt 
prosecutions for alleged violations of that order. 
 235. Costs of discovery imposed not for the purposes of obtaining information but to 
coerce settlement have been named “impositional benefits.” John K. Setear, The Barrister and 
the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 569 (1989). 
 236. I am indebted to my sometimes co-teacher Chief Justice Randy T. Shepard of the 
Indiana Supreme Court for pointing out to me that judges rarely perceive the costs that 
unfounded suits impose on others. 
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procedural rules currently permit. Traditionally called “strike suits,”237 
such cases are filed not because of their probability of success on the 
merits but because of the settlement value that they create by imposing 
defense costs on those who are sued. One can debate the frequency with 
which such cases occur and the size of the deadweight loss that they 
impose on the economy, but one cannot deny that they exist. In a 
famous article in 1979, Professors William M. Landes and Richard A. 
Posner formally showed that even cases with little or no prospect of 
success do create settlement value in proportion to the costs of 
litigation.
238
 Empirical data are not very good on how large the dead-
weight loss to the economy is from such cases. One empirical study of 
employment discrimination cases concluded that it makes economic 
sense for an employer to pay at least $4,000 per claim regardless of 
merit simply to avoid costs of defense.
239
 A strike suit is an “arbitrage” 
pure and simple: economic value is manufactured not by creating 
anything socially useful, but simply by doing a transaction over and 
over where there is a discontinuity between its payoffs and its expected 
costs.
240
 The discontinuity between expected costs and benefits is in 
turn a function of the endemic judicial reluctance to allocate the costs of 
litigation from those upon whom they fall initially to those who cause 
them.
241
 Judges should not confuse allocating costs to those who request 
discovery  with penalties. There is nothing punitive about requiring an 
economic actor to pay for resources that are consumed in an activity 
                                                                                                                     
 237. “A strike suit is a non-meritorious action brought to blackmail management into a 
settlement so that management can avoid the costly process of continued litigation, particularly 
the costs of discovery.” Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 119 (1999). 
 238. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235, 259–62 (1979) (describing relationship between size of “stakes” in litigation and 
settlement). It is an implication of Landes and Posner’s famous formula that even a case with an 
expected value of zero on both sides will create settlement value in the form of a joint asset, the 
litigation costs that can be avoided by settling. Why defendants would be willing to pay 
settlement value rather than litigate to discourage future strike suits is a more complicated 
puzzle in game theory, but it too has been solved. 
 239. David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for 
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1579 
(2005) (“Because it costs employers (1) between $4000 and $10,000 to defend an EEOC charge, 
(2) at least $75,000 to take a case to summary judgment, and at least $125,000 and possibly 
about $500,000 to defend a case at trial, it almost always makes good business sense to settle a 
case for $4000.”). Costs will vary, however, by geographic area of the country and type of case. 
 240. “An arbitrage opportunity is an investment strategy that guarantees a positive payoff 
in some contingency with no possibility of a negative payoff and with no net investment.” Philip 
H. Dybvig & Stephen A. Ross, Arbitrage, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
ONLINE, http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_A000123 (last visited May 
2, 2012). 
 241. Some of the reasons that judges are reluctant to second-guess decisions by litigants are 
catalogued in Elliott, Managerial Judging, supra note 19, at 331–33. 
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that he undertakes to make a profit.
242
 On the contrary, the philosophy 
behind a market economy is that resources will be used most efficiently 
if those who decide to consume them pay the marginal costs of 
production.
243
 For the same reasons that electricity will be wasted and 
overconsumed if government requires it to be supplied at a price below 
the marginal cost of production, litigation will be oversupplied, wasting 
societal resources, if those who initiate litigation pay only a small 
fraction of its cost.  
The root of the judicial reluctance to impose the costs of litigation 
on those who are in the best position to determine whether the 
expenditure of resources is justified is in turn embedded in Rule 4 and 
the perverse incentives that it creates: judges are required by law and 
custom to presume that every case filed in court is valid until shown 
otherwise, and the “showing otherwise” is expensive.  
Although this constitutional defect in Rule 4 is perhaps the most 
clear-cut, it is not desirable to fix Rule 4 by developing more 
constraining standards for when private parties may exercise the state 
power to summon. That was the function that the “forms of action” 
performed until they were abolished by the Field Code in New York in 
1848, and at the federal level by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938. By delimiting acceptable categories for suit, the state historically 
constrained the basis by which one party could hale another into court. 
It is not desirable to bring back the rigidity of the “forms of action.” 
However, without the forms of action to constrain private discretion 
regarding the basis for suit, the state must now make a PSPD—a 
preliminary inquiry into whether the plaintiff’s claims are sufficiently 
plausible on both legal and factual grounds such that the state may 
reasonably require the person sued to answer them—or routinely award 
full costs afterwards. 
Courts are already required by statute to do this for civil claims 
brought in forma pauperis. The federal in forma pauperis statute 
provides: 
                                                                                                                     
 242. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 221, at 774. 
 243. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 224 (1984) (“Sound regulatory 
policy, [Cornell economist and Carter Administration official Alfred Kahn] never tired of 
explaining, requires that buyers pay the marginal cost of all the goods and services they receive. 
If five units of an item cost $40 to produce and six units cost $60, then the marginal cost of the 
item is not $8 or $10 but $20. If the sixth unit is priced at $10 (that is, at average cost), 
consumers will purchase too many units—often not just one too many, but several—and since 
consumers have only a certain amount of money to spend, they will be able to buy too few units 
of other items, relative to what they would do under allocative efficiency. When goods and 
services are not priced according to marginal costs, therefore, consumers will automatically 
bring about a misallocation of society’s resources. In order to prevent this unhappy result, Kahn 
believed, the prices of all goods and services should be set ‘at the margin’—that is, they should 
be pegged to the cost of producing one more unit at a particular time.”) 
Id. 
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[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 
determines that— 
. . . .  
(B) the action or appeal— 
(i) is frivolous or malicious; 
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 
immune from such relief.
244
 
In a 1989 decision, Neitzke v. Williams,
245
 a unanimous Supreme 
Court, speaking through Justice Thurgood Marshall, explained the 
rationale for differing treatment between in forma pauperis cases and 
those brought by paying customers as follows: 
Congress recognized, however, that a litigant whose filing 
fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a 
paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from 
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits. To 
prevent such abusive or captious litigation, § 1915(d) [now 
(e)] authorizes federal courts to dismiss a claim filed in 
forma pauperis “if . . . satisfied that the action is frivolous 
or malicious.” Dismissals on these grounds are often made 
sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare 
prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of 
answering such complaints.
246
 
That was, however, before Twombly and Iqbal. The Neitzke Court 
cited with approval Conley v. Gibson’s247 very liberal pleading standard 
that no actionable set of facts could be proven under the allegations.
248
 
This standard was later specifically disavowed in Twombly.
249
 The main 
concern of the Court in Neitzke seems to have been to make sure that 
poor people were given just as much leeway as rich ones to file cases 
even if they ultimately proved unfounded.
250
 But this laudable goal of 
                                                                                                                     
 244. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006). 
 245. 490 U.S. 319 (1989). 
 246. Id. at 324 (citing Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 247. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 248. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. 
 249. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–63 (2007) (concluding that the Conley 
standard of “no set of facts” can be proved under the allegations of the complaint is “best 
forgotten”). 
 250. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 329–30 asserted: 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily 
accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and 
an opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled upon. These 
procedures alert him to the legal theory underlying the defendant’s challenge, 
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equality between rich and poor litigants was achieved by harmonizing 
in the wrong direction. Paying customers should be subject to the same 
sua sponte review for frivolousness before service of process as are their 
fellow citizens who are indigent. 
In a footnote, the Neitzke Court noted the issue of whether sua 
sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), as opposed to under the in forma 
pauperis statute, are permissible, but did not answer it.
251
 The Court did 
state in dicta, however, that “[a] patently insubstantial complaint may be 
dismissed, for example, for want of subject-matter jurisdiction under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”252 
The question left open by the Supreme Court in Neitzke regarding 
the authority of a federal court to dismiss sua sponte before service of 
process in an ordinary case under Rule 12(b)(6), as opposed to under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e) in an in forma pauperis case, was answered in the 
affirmative by the D.C. Circuit in Baker v. Director, United States 
Parole Commission.
253
 That per curiam decision is of particular interest 
because the panel included then-Circuit Judges Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
                                                                                                                     
and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing the motion to dismiss on 
legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as to conform with the 
requirements of a valid legal cause of action. This adversarial process also 
crystallizes the pertinent issues and facilitates appellate review of a trial court 
dismissal by creating a more complete record of the case. . . . By contrast, the 
sua sponte dismissals permitted by, and frequently employed under, § 1915(d), 
necessary though they may sometimes be to shield defendants from vexatious 
lawsuits, involve no such procedural protections. 
To conflate the standards of frivolousness and failure to state a claim, as 
petitioners urge, would thus deny indigent plaintiffs the practical protections 
against unwarranted dismissal generally accorded paying plaintiffs under the 
Federal Rules. A complaint like that filed by Williams under the Eighth 
Amendment, whose only defect was its failure to state a claim, will in all 
likelihood be dismissed sua sponte, whereas an identical complaint filed by a 
paying plaintiff will in all likelihood receive the considerable benefits of the 
adversary proceedings contemplated by the Federal Rules. Given Congress’ 
goal of putting indigent plaintiffs on a similar footing with paying plaintiffs, 
petitioners’ interpretation cannot reasonably be sustained. According 
opportunities for responsive pleadings to indigent litigants commensurate to the 
opportunities accorded similarly situated paying plaintiffs is all the more 
important because indigent plaintiffs so often proceed pro se and therefore may 
be less capable of formulating legally competent initial pleadings. 
Id. Congress evidently disagreed, however, as it subsequently amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to add 
“failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted” as a ground for sua sponte dismissal in 
in forma pauperis cases.  
 251. Id. at 329 n.8 (“We have no occasion to pass judgment, however, on the permissible 
scope, if any, of sua sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).”). 
 252. Id. at 327 n.6 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 
327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946)). 
 253. 916 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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and Clarence Thomas, arguably the most liberal and most conservative 
Justices of the current Supreme Court. They both joined Judge 
Lawrence Silberman in holding that a sua sponte dismissal prior to 
service of process was proper under Rule 12(b)(6), even in a case not 
brought under the in forma pauperis statute, “where the plaintiff has not 
advanced a shred of a valid claim.”254 Other circuits hold to the 
contrary,
255
 however, and there is a clear circuit split that will eventually 
have to be resolved by the Supreme Court. A Supreme Court case 
addressing that circuit split might be a good occasion to introduce the 
Pre-Service Plausibility Determination process advocated by this 
Article. 
Even if the power asserted by the D.C. Circuit in Baker to dismiss 
an occasional case before service sua sponte were to be recognized 
more generally, that would not obviate the need for a change to the 
language of Rule 4 as proposed below.
256
 The principal drafter of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Charles E. Clark, sagely pointed out 
long ago that the Rules should not only grant judicial power, but 
especially when they aspire to change judicial behavior, they must also 
explain how and why that power is to be used.
257
 The current practice, 
by which the clerk’s office issues the summons automatically without 
any preliminary determination by the court that it is reasonable to 
require the person being sued to answer, is now so deeply embedded in 
the federal procedural system that a change in rule language is 
desirable. 
III.  THE GOVERNMENT MUST VERIFY THE PLAUSIBILITY OF CIVIL 
CLAIMS BEFORE IT ORDERS PERSONS TO ANSWER THEM 
Perhaps the anomalies described above would be tolerable if they 
were unavoidable, but there is a simple solution, which is routinely 
followed in many other areas of our law—the PSPD. Before summoning 
someone to spend a substantial amount of time and money defending a 
lawsuit, a court official should make an inquiry appropriate under the 
                                                                                                                     
 254. Id. at 726–27; accord Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 
1987).  
 255. Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797–98 (2d Cir. 1988); Morrison v. Tomano, 755 F.2d 
515, 516–17 (6th Cir. 1985); Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de P.R., Inc., 695 F.2d 
524, 526–27 (11th Cir. 1983); Frankos v. LaVallee, 535 F.2d 1346, 1347 (2d. Cir. 1976); cf. 
Literature, Inc. v. Quinn, 482 F.2d 372, 374 (1st Cir. 1973) (stating that failure to give plaintiff 
prior notice “might well justify reversal,” but reversed on other grounds). 
 256. See infra Part III. 
 257. Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes 
and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 501 (1950) (“[W]ithout a tradition for the exercise of 
discretion, a general grant of power is likely to accomplish little. Habitually courts act according 
to precept and custom. If left to their own devices, without any precise guide beyond a general 
authorization, they will stick to what they have known in the past.”). 
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circumstances to verify that there is a plausible basis for the claim that 
is sufficient in law and fact for it to be reasonable for the state to 
require the defendant to answer. This does not mean that plaintiffs must 
show that they are going to win their lawsuit. It simply means that the 
government has an obligation to determine that there is a sufficiently 
reasonable basis for the suit so that the state is not complicit in fraud or 
extortion or is not itself acting arbitrarily by ordering the defendant to 
appear and defend. This minimal threshold requirement is not satisfied 
merely because someone fills in their name and address and the name of 
the person that they want to sue on a government form. 
Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently reads as 
follows: 
(b) Issuance. On or after filing the complaint, the plaintiff 
may present a summons to the clerk for signature and seal. 
If the summons is properly completed, the clerk must sign, 
seal, and issue it to the plaintiff for service on the 
defendant. A summons—or a copy of a summons that is 
addressed to multiple defendants—must be issued for each 
defendant to be served.
258
 
For the reasons described in this Article, Rule 4(b) should be 
amended to read as follows: 
(b) Issuance. On or after filing the complaint, the plaintiff 
may present a summons to the clerk for signature and seal. 
If the summons is properly completed, and a magistrate 
judge or district judge determines from review of the 
complaint and other appropriate inquiries that it is 
reasonable to summon one or more of the proposed 
defendants to answer, the clerk must sign, seal, and issue it 
to the plaintiff for service on that defendant. A summons—
or a copy of a summons that is addressed to multiple 
defendants—must be issued for each defendant to be 
served. 
The concept of minimal governmental inquiry before imposing a 
substantial burden on a citizen is common in  our law. In fact, we honor 
that principle in every area of the law—except when summoning 
someone to defend a civil lawsuit under Rule 4 and its state equivalents 
when a filing fee has been paid. This is clear discrimination in favor of 
the wealthy and should be eliminated by subjecting them to the same 
standard of pre-service review that is already applied in in forma 
pauperis cases or to subpoenas by government agencies. That someone 
                                                                                                                     
 258.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(b). 
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is able to afford a $350 filing fee should not entitle them to co-opt the 
state’s power to seize the time and money of another free citizen 
without reasonable verification by the state that the imposition is 
justified. 
The system of civil procedure creates a series of “hurdles” of 
increasing height that are tailored to the appropriateness of moving to 
the next stage: 
(1) At the Rule 4 stage, the proper question is a very modest one: 
whether the case appears to be sufficiently plausible that it is reasonable 
for the state to require the defendant to appear and respond to the 
complaint. 
(2) At the Rule 12 stage, the proper question is a different one: 
whether the plaintiff has stated a legally-cognizable claim such that it is 
reasonable to subject the defendant to the costs and intrusion of 
discovery. 
(3) At the Rule 56 stage, the proper question is whether a sufficient 
dispute of material fact exists after discovery that the case should be 
heard by the trier of fact. 
In Twombly and Iqbal the Supreme Court correctly perceived the 
problem of imposing costs on those sued without verifying that there is 
sufficient merit to the claim to justify doing so, but it located the 
solution in the wrong place, using the wrong mechanism. The proper 
function of the complaint in the modern procedural system is to state the 
plaintiff’s legal theories with sufficient particularity so that their legal 
sufficiency can be tested via a motion to dismiss. It is impossible in any 
system to maximize two or more variables simultaneously.
259
 Other 
things being equal, procedural devices work better when they are not 
asked to perform multiple, inconsistent functions. While there should be 
a modest hurdle before the defendant is haled into court by the state, it 
does not necessarily follow that we should return to detailed fact-
pleading in the complaint. There are many well-known deficiencies in a 
system that requires that the plaintiff be in possession of all the facts 
necessary to take a case to trial as a pre-condition to bringing a claim. 
Rather than reinvent fact pleading, with all of its well-known 
drawbacks and inefficiencies, we should adapt new procedural devices 
as part of Rule 4. These procedures should be properly adapted to the 
purpose of determining whether it is reasonable for the state to summon 
the persons identified by the plaintiff and put them to the burden and 
expense of defending a particular claim. That would consist of a two-
pronged inquiry (1) whether a claim is sufficiently plausible based on 
the available facts and existing law that it is reasonable for the state to 
                                                                                                                     
 259. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968) (citing 
JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 11 
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compel the persons that the plaintiff wishes to sue to incur the costs and 
inconvenience of appearing in court; and if not, (2) whether the plaintiff 
is sufficiently likely to develop the necessary facts or law at a later 
date.
260
 Some “speculative but reasonable” cases should be allowed for 
their broader social utility even though the available facts, law, or both 
do not support the claim. But it does not follow that (1) the power to 
bring claims that are not currently justified by the available facts or the 
law should be delegated to private self-interested individuals without 
any standards or review by the state; or (2) the costs of the resources 
consumed in a speculative effort to develop facts or law should be 
subsidized by the persons sued regardless of how the economic venture 
ultimately turns out.
261
 
A judicial official such as a magistrate judge should engage in a 
preliminary examination of a lawsuit before summoning the defendant 
to respond in order to determine that the lawsuit is plausible enough that 
it is reasonable for the state to put the defendant through the time and 
expense of responding. In many instances, this could be done simply by 
reviewing the complaint—particularly if it pleads facts with sufficient 
specificity and is verified under oath or attaches key items of evidence, 
such as the contract or promissory note upon which suit is based. 
Moreover, complaints could identify key pieces of evidence that 
plaintiff does not presently have in its possession but hopes to obtain 
through discovery. 
The incentives created by advance knowledge that the complaint 
must satisfy a standard of minimal plausibility and reasonableness 
would do more than any reworking of Rule 8 to ensure that 
complainants plead cases with reasonable specificity. The practice of 
preliminary judicial review of complaints before service in Germany 
reportedly has exactly that effect: those drafting complaints want to put 
enough in them to convince the judicial official reviewing them before 
service that there is a valid basis for suit so that they will summon the 
defendant without further delay. 
The expectation of preliminary review [in Germany] helps 
deter frivolous complaints. Yet that review should not deter 
                                                                                                                     
 260. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (“By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or 
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 261. See Orr v. Turco Mfg. Co., Inc., 512 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ind. 1987) (Shepard, C.J., 
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many meritorious complaints, since plaintiffs do not plead 
at their peril. Should the judge have concerns about 
whether the procedural prerequisites are met, or about 
whether the complaint sufficiently substantiates the factual 
allegations, the judge should direct the plaintiff to clarify 
the point before dismissing the case.
262
 
In situations in which the complaint itself does not contain enough 
information to verify that it is reasonable for the government to put the 
defendant through the time and trouble to answer a lawsuit, the 
reviewing magistrate should telephone or invite in the plaintiff’s lawyer 
for an informal oral conference and ask appropriate questions, in much 
the same way that judges and magistrates already do before issuing 
search warrants.
263
 This oral conference would be similar to the first 
status conference that is typically held today, in which the judge finds 
out what the case is about but it should occur pre-service. 
The conference, if one is needed because not enough information is 
provided in support of the complaint, could ordinarily involve only the 
plaintiff’s lawyer to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on the 
prospective defendants before the state has verified that there is a 
reasonable basis to do so.  
Over time, experience would teach reviewing magistrates that many 
defendants are often wrongly included in certain kinds of cases, and 
they would start asking this question of plaintiffs’ lawyers. To forestall 
the inquiry, plaintiffs might start determining who is involved before 
they file their cases, and reciting same in the complaints before they file 
them. 
If a reviewing judge or magistrate decides to hold a conference 
rather than sign off on the complaint, the preliminary complaint review 
and verification conference should be on the record before a court 
reporter. A transcript should be made and, in accordance with the usual 
final judgment rule, an appeal would be available if the reviewing judge 
refuses to authorize service of the complaint, but not if the judge 
decides to proceed with service. 
 Plaintiffs should be encouraged by gentle questioning about 
missing evidence to identify in their complaints any crucial “missing 
link” evidence that they anticipate obtaining through discovery. For 
example, a plaintiff might state: “Despite having interviewed all of the 
decedent’s known coworkers, I do not currently have product 
                                                                                                                     
 262. James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It, 114 
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 263. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(2)(A) (“When a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney 
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identification evidence for eight of the ten manufacturers named in the 
complaint, but I hope to obtain this evidence through discovery of their 
records, which I believe will show that they sold their products to 
decedent’s employers at the location where decedent worked.” The 
court can then assess whether it is sufficiently likely that the crucial 
evidence will turn up that it is reasonable to go forward. The threshold 
for showing plausibility could be lower if plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely 
paid for the costs of inquiries to try to find crucial missing evidence 
because we would not be requiring the persons sued to subsidize their 
inquiries.
264
 
As we already do in criminal cases, or when courts are asked to 
enforce administrative subpoenas,
265
 or issue search warrants, in habeas 
corpus or in forma pauperis civil cases, or as many other procedural 
systems also do in civil cases, it is possible for the state to conduct a 
modest preliminary inquiry into the bona fides of cases before the state 
summons the defendant to appear and begin spending resources. This 
Article has argued that minimal preliminary inquiry by the state is 
constitutionally required, but regardless of whether the courts ultimately 
so rule, the constitutional values at stake show that as a matter of policy, 
the Rules should require a magistrate judge to conduct a preliminary 
inquiry into the likely merit of a claim before those sued are required to 
answer it. This should be done at the Rule 4 stage, before the federal 
government orders the persons sued to appear in court and compels 
them to begin expending their resources to answer the claim. 
Finally, those who would object that a PSPD is impractical should 
remember that (1) we already conduct such an inquiry in many civil 
cases; only the rich who can afford to pay the filing fee are exempt from 
it, and (2) we did it routinely in all federal cases between 1789 and 
1938. 
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